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CHAPTER I
From Working to Application: Documenting
Employment Transitions of Applicants for Social
Security Disability Insurance
1.1 Introduction
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) provides monetary and medical bene-
fits to 7.8 Million beneficiaries in 2009. Along with the strong increase in program
participation since the early 1990s has come a renewed interest in understanding
how economic and other factors influence application decisions. The purpose of
the paper is to document the scope and nature of transitions from working to not
working which occur before individuals apply for DI.
Three main findings emerge. First, the majority of applicants for DI experience
a transition from being employed to being without work prior to their application.
These employment transitions account for most of the observed income decline
before application. Second, the majority of workers report either the onset of a
work limitation or an illness or injury shortly before they become non-employed.
And third, even though most non-employment episodes begin with a health shock,
applicants typically do not move quickly onto DI. Furthermore, classifying these
non-employment spells by beginning events reveals that search effort, UI take-up,
and DI application success differ by reason of job loss. Similar differences can also
1
be found when comparing the first month of non-employment to the month where
the individual applies for DI.
These results have important implications for our understanding of application
decisions. Halpern and Hausman (1986) treat application decisions as a choice
between applying for the program and working. Subsequent studies such as Krei-
der (1998, 1999) and Lahiri et al. (2008) have increased the degree of complexity,
but maintained the premise that workers make a decision between applying for DI
versus working. In contrast, Autor and Duggan (2003) and Bratsberg et al. (2010)
recently emphasize that job loss prior to application for DI is an important factor
influencing application decisions. This paper contributes to this line of research
by analyzing beginning events and characteristics of non-employment spells be-
fore applications for DI occur. The results suggest that economic conditions at the
beginning and during these spells may influence application decisions. Therefore,
the decisions process of an individual at the verge of applying for DI might be
better characterized as one of job search versus application for DI, where job op-
portunities, transfer income, and search intensity all could influence the decision
to apply for DI. An example of this approach is provided by Lindner (2011), who
analyzes how unemployment insurance benefits influence the decision to apply for
DI of health-impaired, unemployed workers.
The article also contributes to our understanding of the effect of health shocks
on employment and application for DI. Previous studies such as Benitez-Silva et al.
(2004) show that onset of a severe work limitation drastically reduces the fraction
of people who work. On the other hand, aggregate-level studies such as Rupp
and Stapleton (1995) point out that DI applications are positively correlated with
the unemployment rate, implying that bad economic conditions are an important
reason why people apply for DI. The results of this paper suggest that these
pathways are not mutually exclusive: most applicants do report a health shock
2
around the time they stop working, but they also do not immediately move onto
DI.
This paper is also related to Burkhauser et al. (2004) and Bound et al. (2003).
Burkhauser et al. analyze how the timing of applications depends on factors such
as employer accommodations, but they do not consider transitions from working to
being without work. Bound et al. document that applicants for DI or SSI buffer
their pre- and post-application income losses with other income sources. This
article uses data similar to theirs, but focuses on the role of prior employment
transitions and circumstances at the beginning and during non-employment for
application decisions.
The following section provides a brief overview of the DI program, followed by
an explanation of the data used for this study. Section 1.4 documents transitions
from employment to DI application and section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background
DI was enacted in 1956 to insure workers as well as their spouses and depen-
dents against loss of earnings due to disabilities by providing monetary transfers
and access to Medicare. In 1974, SSI for the Disabled and Blind was added as a
second program aimed at disabled adults. For both programs, disability is defined
as
(...) the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted, or can
be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.1
1See See Title II of the Social Security Act, Section 223. [42U.S.C. 423], (d)(1)(A)
(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP Home/ssact/title02/0223.htm.)
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In practice, whether a person can engage in substantial gainful activity is
operationalized by an earnings threshold. This earnings threshold, which was
$200 for the non-blind in 1975, has been raised sporadically to $700 by 2000.
Since then, it has been adjusted for inflation, and as of 2009 has reached $1,000.
For both programs, initial applications are determined by a sequential five-
stage procedure, which assesses the applicant’s health impairment severity and
work capacity.2 While initial applications are processed relatively quickly, only
a minority of applicants are accepted.3 The appeal process itself has several
stages, namely reconsideration, administrative law judge (where most appeals are
decided), appeals board, and federal court. Applicants who appeal an initial denial
have a high chance to be awarded benefits, but the appeals process can extend
over several months, and often exceeds a year or more (Benitez-Silva et al., 1999).
While medical eligibility criteria are the same for both insurance programs,
their non-medical eligibility criteria are somewhat different. Eligibility for DI
requires a recent and relatively steady work history.4 Eligibility for SSI does
not stipulate this work history, but people must have income and assets below
certain thresholds. Individuals can apply for both programs if they meet their
respective non-medical requirements. About one quarter of applicants apply for
both programs.
The DI program grew strongly during the 1960s and 1970s. In the mid-
seventies, the Social Security Administration (SSA) tried to reduce the number
2See for instance Hu et al. (2001) for a description of the initial application process.
3For instance, in 2002, only about 37 per cent of all initial applications were accepted at
the initial determination. About one-third of initially denied applicants appeal the decision
(Szymendera, 2006).
4Specifically, workers need to be to be both disability-insured and fully insured in order
to be eligible for DI benefits. Workers aged 31 or older are disability-insured if they have
worked in Social Security covered employment during 20 of the 40 quarters prior to their date of
disablement. They are fully insured if they have worked in covered employment for, on average,
1 out of every 4 quarters between the year they turned 21 and the year before the year in which
they reached age 62 or became disabled.
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of admissions by refining the regulation guiding decisions. In 1980, Congress
passed further legislation which made it more difficult to receive benefits. As
a result, award rates fell from 48.8 percent to 33.3 percent between 1975 and
1980. Widespread criticism led Congress to reverse its policies in 1984. These
amendments increased the number of medical impairments which qualify for DI,
and shifted the weight towards evidence provided by the claimant’s own physi-
cian. Further liberalizations were implemented in 1988 and 1991. Since then, the
number of DI beneficiaries has steadily increased.
Most applications for the two programs occur during economic downturns,
when the unemployment rate is high (Rupp and Stapleton, 1995). This positive
correlation between the unemployment rate and applications for DI has lead re-
searchers to hypothesize that job loss is an important event causing many potential
applicants to file an application (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Bratsberg et al., 2010).
In what follows, the frequency and characteristics of transitions from employment
to non-employment for DI applications are examined. Before doing so, the next
section describes data used for this analysis.
1.3 Data
This study uses several Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
panels which are matched to administrative records. The SIPP is a nationally
representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and older of the civilian non-
institutionalized population. The main objective of the SIPP is to provide accu-
rate and comprehensive information about income and program participation of
individuals and households in the United States. People are interviewed once ev-
ery four months, called a wave, for two to four years. When sampling a new SIPP,
the Census Bureau randomly groups people into four rotation groups. Starting
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with the first rotation group, each subsequent rotation group is interviewed one
month after the previous one. When interviewed, respondents are asked to pro-
vide information about the preceding four months, which are also called reference
months. For this study, SIPP covering the period 1990 to 2004 are used.5
While the SIPP provides information on employment, demographic character-
istics, and participation in transfer programs, it does not contain application dates
and outcome decisions for DI. To overcome this limitation, the SIPP is matched to
administrative records on DI applications and their respective award decisions us-
ing Social Security Numbers (SSN). Applications are identified through so-called
831 files. When a person applies for DI, an 831 file is opened. It subsequently
tracks the application and initial determination.
While 831 files record applications including the reconsideration stage, they do
not record subsequent appeals. In order to improve the accuracy of the application
information, 831 files are augmented by the Master Beneficiary Records (MBR).
These records contain complete application information including appeals for the
latest disability application of an applicant. Earlier applications, however, are
erased from the MBR records. For such applications, the application outcome can
still be recovered with the help of the Payment History Update System (PHUS),
which records who receives DI benefits. MBR and PHUS records are matched to
831 files using application and benefit start dates, respectively.6
Sample selection proceeds in several stages, as shown in table 1.1. From the
universe of men and women between the age of 20 and 65, those who do not report
5These are: SIPP 1990, 1992, 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001. Administrative records are cur-
rently only available until 2004, so the 2004 SIPP could not be linked to administrative data for
the purpose of this study.
6In practice, dates of filing might differ for same applications in these files. Therefore, we
matched records which were filed within 50 days. PHUS records are matched to 831 or MBR
records if the benefit start date is within 100 days of the date an application decision has been
reached.
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their Social Security Number have to be disregarded since they cannot be linked
to Social Security’s administrative records. Next, civilians who apply for DI while
being surveyed for the SIPP are selected. SSI applicants are kept in the sample
only if they also apply for DI. For some of the panels, a wave is missing and they
are disregarded as well. After these steps, 2,122 applicants for disability insurance
remain in the sample.
Based on this sample, I also create spells of non-employment. For these
episodes, only applicants who did not work at the time of application are con-
sidered. Furthermore, non-employment spells might be left-censored. Such spells
are disregarded as well.7 There are 984 applicants for which at least one com-
plete spell of non-employment prior to DI application is observed. Only non-
employment spells ending with an application are considered.
1.4 The role of employment transitions for DI applications
1.4.1 Scope of employment transitions
The analysis begins with employment and work limitation trends within 30
months before and after application for DI, using the panel of 2,122 applicants.
Figure 1.1 presents the percentage of applicants who have reported a work lim-
itation 30 months before and 30 months after applying for DI. The fraction of
applicants reporting a work limitation increases steadily 30 to 10 months before
application, and then accelerates during the last 10 months. At the month of
application, 78.61 percent of all individuals report a work limitation. Afterward,
the percentage still increases further, albeit at a small rate.
7For left-censored spells, the initial date of job separation can be reconstructed using SIPP’s
employment history module. However, other demographic information cannot be recovered in
this way. Therefore, left-censored spells are not kept in the sample.
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It is puzzling that not 100 percent of all individuals report a work limitation
when they apply for DI, since a work limitation is necessary to qualify for the
program. The work limitation question is not included in all waves for SIPP 1990
to 1993. For these surveys, some of the workers might not have the chance to
express a newly occurred work limitation at the time they apply for DI. Repeating
the trend in reported work limitation by application status separately for SIPP
1990 to 1993 and SIPP 1996 and 2001, as shown in figure 1.2, reveals that this
survey design problem can explain half of the gap. For SIPP 1996 and 2001, 89.90
percent of all workers report a work limitation when they apply for DI. Still, 10
percent apply without having reported a work limitation. Non-response cannot
account for this gap since less than 0.5 percent of all responses for this question
were imputed. Left-censoring might be part of the explanation. Using SIPP 1996
and 2001, the months observed before application for those with and without
work limitation at time of application are compared. The average difference in
observed months prior to application is 3.21 months. However, most applications
do not occur right after start of the SIPP survey. The average months observed
before application is 16.51 for individuals without a work limitation at time of
application and 19.74 months for individual with a work limitation at time of
application.
Turning to the employment rate of applicants, figure 1.3 shows the average
employment rate 30 months before and after application. The employment rate
starts at about 77.50 percent, decreases to 62.94 percent 10 months before applica-
tion, and then declines strongly to 28.28 percent during the month of application.
Therefore, most applicants for DI experience a transition from working to not
working shortly before applying for DI. Loss of employment can also explain most
of the observed income decline prior to application. Figure 1.4 shows first income
of applicants in the 15 months before application, and then decomposes the in-
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come change into income change due to job loss as well residual income change.8
The change in income due to the change in employment tracks the overall income
decline very closely until the last 4 months before application.
Reported work limitations increases strongly in the 10 months before DI ap-
plication. During the same time, employment rates drop strongly. To see more
clearly how employment is influenced by the onset of a work limitation, figure 1.5
presents monthly employment rates of applicants, but this time centered around
the first month a work limitation is reported. The employment rate drops at
the month the work limitation begins, but there is also further decline during
the months following onset of a work limitation. The employment decline at the
onset of a work limitation is much less pronounced than the employment decline
from 60 percent to 15 percent reported by Benitez-Silva et al. (2004). Since they
use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), the difference in the employment
decline at onset of a work limitation is most likely due to different ways the work
limitation question is worded. In the SIPP, a respondent is classified as being
health impaired if he or she answers yes to the following question: “Does ... have
a physical, mental or other health condition that limits the kind or amount of
work ... can do?”. In the HRS, by contrast, a respondent is only classified as
being health impaired if he or she answers yes to both of the following questions:
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From the decomposition, the income decline due to changes in the earnings and unearned
income of people working can be calculated by applying the first expression of the right-hand
side to subsequent periods, while the income decline due to changes in the fraction of people
working can be calculated by applying the second expression of the right-hand side to subsequent
periods, as shown in figure 1.4.
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“Do you have any impairment or health problem that limits the amount of paid
work you can do? If so, does this limitation keep you from working altogether?”
In addition, individuals are interviewed only every other year in the HRS. There-
fore, recall bias which clumps together reported dates of health and employment
changes is likely to be more severe for the HRS.
Together, these trends show that most applicants start reporting a work limi-
tation and stop working before applying for DI. Less clear is whether a majority of
these job losses occur because of the onset of a work limitation, or whether other
economic factors such as getting laid off play a role as well. Furthermore, episodes
of non-employment could be very different in terms of spell length or search be-
havior depending on the reason why individuals stop working. To address these
questions, I now turn to the spells of non-employment preceding applications.
1.4.2 Analysis of Non-Employment episodes
In what follows, the sub-sample of applicants with fully observed non-employ-
ment episodes which end in application for DI are used. In all tables, fields with
fewer than 10 observations are masked with XXX to avoid disclosure risk.
Spell duration: Table 1.2 reports the hazard rate to DI application and the
fraction of non-employed workers who have not yet applied for DI for the first 12
months of non-employment spells. The hazard rate is also shown in figure 1.6. The
hazard rate to DI application is remarkably high for the twelve months considered.
While it is higher in the first four months as compared to later months, and peaks
in the second month at 0.24, it remains above 0.10 for all of the twelve months
except for the 9th month. Clearly, applicants do not immediately apply for DI as
soon as they become jobless. More than 30 percent of them do not apply before
10
being without a job for six months or more.
Classification of beginning events: In order to identify whether a health
shock or other factors contribute to the observed job loss, a hierarchical classi-
fication scheme for beginning events is developed. Several variables are used to
identify beginning events. Table 1.3 shows variables identifying beginning events.
The first group contains applicants those spells begin because of an illness or
injury. Two sets of questions in the SIPP provide this information. First, an
individual who is absent from work may report an illness or injury as the reason
for not being at work.9 Second, for SIPP 1996 and 2001, workers who stop working
during a wave or who do not work during the entire wave may report an injury
or illness as reason why they do not work.
The second group of applicants are those who report a work limitation shortly
before they stop working. Two definitions are used, a broad and a narrow one.
For the broad definition, a work limitation must be reported at least once during
the first month of non-employment or during the 8 months before the the non-
employment spell begins, but not earlier than that. The time window for the
narrow definition is 4 months. The multiples of 4 are used because most changes
in reported health and employment occur between waves and not within, which
is a manifestation of the seam bias. Months with no information about a work
limitation are treated as months without work limitation. Such missing values
occur for the 1990 to 1993 SIPP because these surveys only include questions
about health in selected modules.
The true onset of a work limitation might not be observed since the SIPP
9Months during which a worker is absent from work are considered as months of full employ-
ment, and therefore are not directly included in the sample of non-employment spells. However,
if a worker is first absent from work and then stops working during a wave, then the wave
contains information why the worker was absent before the non-employment spell.
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follows respondents for only 2 to 4 years. As a result, too many non-employment
spells are classified as starting with the onset of a work limitation, for two possible
reasons. First, only 8 (4) or fewer months before job loss may be observed. If
a work limitation is reported for all of these months, then the non-employment
spell is still assumed to begin with the onset of a work limitation, even though the
true, unobserved onset of the work limitation could have occurred several months
before the first SIPP interview. Second, work limitation episodes prior of being
surveyed for the SIPP are not recorded. Such earlier episodes, if observed, would
result in an earlier work limitation onset.10
If a spell does not start because of an injury or illness or because of a work
limitation, then six more groups are distinguished: layoff, laid off, discharged, quit,
retirement, and unknown or other events. Layoffs are temporary interruption of
work, while being laid off refers to permanent termination of employment due
to business conditions, economic conditions, or other reasons which are not the
employee’s fault. Workers might also get discharged, or they may quit or retire
from work. These groups are identified through various questions. An individual
who stops working during a wave can chose one of these events as a reason.
Furthermore, a layoff can be identified if the individual is first absent from work.
For SIPP 1996 and 2001, a non-employment spell can also be classified as layoff
or retirement if the individual is out of work during the entire wave.
Finally, some non-employment spells do not fit into any of these categories.
Some spells begin with other events such as taking care of children or going to
school. Other have an unknown beginning events. Such unknown beginning events
10For instance, suppose that a respondent had three health episodes: the first marks a work
limitation, the second no work limitation, and the third episode again a work limitation. If the
person is first interviewed during the second episode, then the beginning of the third episode
would be considered as the onset of a work limitation, even though the true onset occurred
earlier, namely with the first episode. In such a case, a non-employment spell starting right
after the third episode would be wrongly classified as belonging to spells which were caused by
the onset of a work limitation.
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primarily exist because before the SIPP 1996, only respondents who stop working
during a wave are asked why they stop working. Unfortunately, most individuals
report that an employment change occurs between waves. Furthermore, contingent
workers are not asked why they stop working.
Table 1.4 presents frequencies of beginning events. For the broad definition
of work limitation onset (first row of category 1.1 in the table), 18.76 percent of
all non-employment spells begin due to an illness or injury, and another 33.08
percent of all spells begin due to a work limitation. Less than 25 percent of
all non-employment spells are classified under the next five categories, and 23.83
percent of all spells cannot be classified or are other events. When the narrow
definition of work limitation onset is used, 26.08 percent of all spells begin in this
way (first row of category 2.1).
Illness or injury as beginning event can be much better identified starting with
the 1996 SIPP. The next two rows show frequencies of beginning events by two
groups, SIPP 1990 to 1993 and SIPP 1996 and 2001. For the second group, almost
half of all spells begin with an injury or illness. By contrast, only 2.52 percent
of all spells can be classified in this way for the SIPP 1990 to 1993. By contrast,
work limitation accounts for 40.11 percent of all beginning events in the SIPP
1996 and 2001, but for less than 20 percent in the SIPP 1990 to 1993. Not known
or other events drop from 32.65 percent to 7.22 percent. Of the few cases left in
this category for the SIPP 1996 and 2001, half are other events, such as taking
care of children or not being interested in working. The other half are contingent
workers, who are not asked why they stop working.
Altogether, health shocks are the predominant beginning event. Presumably,
the most accurate results are from the SIPP 1996 and 2001. For these, at least
two thirds of all spells begin with an illness, injury, or the onset of a work limita-
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tion. This result seems surprising given that figure 1.5 does not exhibit a sharp
employment decline when a work limitation is first reported. However, employ-
ment primarily declines at the onset of a work limitation and during the ensuing
months, and much less so during other months.
Given the low number of job separations due to layoff, being laid off, quit,
discharged, and retirement, it is of interest to ask what an upper bound for these
other reasons is. To do so, beginning events are re-classified by treating illness,
injury, and work limitation as the lowest categories. The results are shown in
table 1.4 as categories 1.2 and 2.2 for the broad and narrow definition of work
limitation onset, respectively. Focusing on results from SIPP 1996 and 2001, at
most 40 percent of all non-employment spells start with a beginning event other
than a health shock. The different types of health shocks together still account
for the majority of beginning events.
Spell characteristics by beginning events: The next table addresses the
question whether non-employment spells differ by beginning events. Table 1.5
presents for the different beginning events spell length, waiting time between
application and award for DI, application success chance, whether individuals
searched, UI eligibility and take-up percentages, and education level. Since lay-
offs and discharges occur very infrequently, they are combined with workers who
are laid off into a new category called job loss. For the table, the hierarchical
classification with illness or injury and work limitation as the highest categories
is used.
As shown in the first column, people who cite an illness or injury apply the
quickest, have the highest chance of receiving benefits, and very rarely search.
There are only few individuals in this category who receive UI benefits (the number
cannot be disclosed), albeit more than 90 percent of them qualify for UI based on
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monetary eligibility criteria. This group of applicants represents the most clear-
cut case of people who experience a health shock, leave employment, and move
onto DI. Still, the average non-employment duration of 4.56 months indicates that
even this group of people does not immediately apply for DI as soon as they stop
working.
The second columns of table 1.5 shows corresponding characteristics for non-
employment spells which start with the onset of a work limitation. Compared
to illnesses and injuries, workers included in the broad work limitation category
remain 0.9 month longer without work before applying for DI, have a 4.84 per-
cent lower application success probability, and are more than twice as likely to
engage in job search. Almost 18 percent of them also receive UI benefits. These
characteristics do not change much if the more narrow definition is used.
Non-employment spells after quits are remarkably similar to non-employment
spells starting with a work limitation. In contrast, the category comprising other
reasons of job loss is characterized by a long non-employment duration, low ap-
plication success probability, high search effort, and a high percentage of workers
who are eligible for and who take up UI benefits. These workers also have the low-
est percentage of high-school graduates and college attendees. Finally, retirement
spells have the longest duration but a short waiting time and high application
success chance.11
Health shocks and spell characteristics across panels: As shown above,
illnesses and injuries are much better identified in the SIPP 1996 and 2001 as
compared to earlier surveys. Conceivably, the more accurate classification of such
11Individuals with an unknown beginning event are by far the least likely to be eligible for
UI benefits. This group consists of contingent workers and workers who stop working for other
reasons such as taking care of children or going to school. Presumably, many of these workers
do not qualify for UI benefits on monetary grounds.
15
beginning events also translates into different spell characteristics for these two
SIPP groups. Table 1.6 presents spell characteristics of non-employment episodes
by health shocks and SIPP survey groups. Spells starting with a work limitation
after 1996 are now even more similar to non-employment spells starting with a
job loss from the previous table. By contrast, characteristics for non-employment
spells starting with an injury or illness change little. These results underscore
that a reported illness or injury is a much stronger indicator for a quick transition
to DI application as compared to only a reported work limitation, and that the
additional questions in the SIPP 1996 and 2001 are valuable in identifying this
group of DI applicants.
Beginning versus ending of spells: The economic situation of non-employed
workers considered here might also change over the course of their non-employment
spell. However, comparisons over the course of non-employment episodes is com-
plicated by the fact that individuals leave the sample as they apply for DI. There-
fore, any changes over non-employment duration confounds changes individuals
might experience with changes in the composition of individuals.
To alleviate this problem, table 1.7 simply compares the first month of non-
employment with the month of application. Individuals who apply during the
first month are represented in both groups. Nevertheless, the table reveals some
notable differences between the first and last month. The percentage of people
searching drops by more than 8 percentage points, while the percentage of people
reporting a work limitation increases by 10 percentage points. The latter result is
similar for SIPP 1990 to 1993 and SIPP 1996 and 2001. It is consistent with Sul-
livan and Wachter (2009), who find elevated mortality rates among older workers
who lose their job as compared to similar workers who remain employed. House-
hold income declines slightly. The fraction of individuals receiving UI benefits
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increases slightly, which seems to be counter-intuitive. However, further inspec-
tion of UI recipient reveals that a higher percentage of individuals receives them in
the second and third month than in the first. Apparently, not all individuals who
take up UI benefits do so in the first month of non-employment. Food stamps re-
cipient increases strongly, whereas Worker’s Compensation decreases slightly. The
percentage of people receiving temporary sickness benefits remains fairly constant.
1.5 Conclusion
This article documents transitions from employment to DI application. Most
applicants do not work at the time of application, and instead experience a tran-
sition from working to not working before applying for DI. Focusing on non-
employment spells reveals that most applicants experience an illness, injury, or
the onset of a work limitation shortly before or at the time of job loss. However,
most of these applicants do not immediately apply for DI, but only after several
months without work. Applicants who stop working because of other reasons do
not apply for an even longer time, and show the typical behavior of a person
searching for a job.
These results indicate that the period of time during which individuals are
without work before they apply for DI plays an important role in the application
process. While health problems often contribute to job loss and subsequent ap-
plication for DI, most applicants do not move directly to DI application. Rather,
many applicants first take up unemployment insurance benefits or engage in job
search. These findings suggest that many applicants follow a sequential decision
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Figure 1.1: Onset of work limitation, by months relative to first application for
DI.
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Figure 1.2: Onset of work limitation, by months relative to first application for
DI and SIPP groups.
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Figure 1.3: Employment rate, by months relative to month of first application for
DI.
Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to administrative records
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Figure 1.4: Decomposition of personal income into income change due to change
in employment (“Empl chg.”) and other income change (“No empl. chg.”), by
months relative to month of first application for DI.
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Figure 1.5: Employment rate, by months relative to onset of work limitation.
Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to administrative records
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Figure 1.6: Hazard rate to DI application.
Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to administrative records
23
Table 1.1: Sample Selection
Selection Step Individuals Individiuals for Non-
employment Spells
People 20-65 258130 258130
Disclose SSN 189533 189533
Civilians 187096 187096
No SSI 181244 181244
Application for DI observed 2470 2470
No incomplete panel 2122 2122
Not working while applying — 1518
No left-censored non-employment spell — 984
Note. – The table shows unweighted population numbers for selection steps. Data source:
SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to administrative records. See text for details.
Table 1.2: Hazard and Survival Rate for Non-Employment Spells
Month of Hazard Survival
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.7: Comparison of beginning and ending months
First month Last month
Searched 22.41 16.09
Work Limitation 70.79 80.89
Household income 1872.53 1650.96
UI recipient this month 8.66 9.21
Food Stamp recipient this month 8.25 14.02
Temp. Sickness recipient this month 7.23 7.71
Worker’s Compensation recipient this month 8.45 7.09
Note. – Data source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to administrative records. Spell length
and waiting time are expressed in months, the other rows show percentages. Income is expressed
in 1990 dollars. Person-level population weights are used for all statistics. Fields with less than
10 observations are masked with XXX to avoid disclosure risk.
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CHAPTER II
How Does Unemployment Insurance Affect the
Decision to Apply for Social Security Disability
Insurance?
2.1 Introduction
Unemployment insurance (UI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI)
are two of the primary insurance systems in the United States. They both provide
cash benefits to people out of work. At the beginning of 2010, about 830,000
disabled workers who were not on DI were unemployed, and potentially eligible
for both programs (Joint Economic Committee, 2010). Nevertheless, no current
study has investigated how the availability and benefit levels of UI influence a
workers’ decision to apply for DI.
This paper analyzes how UI take-up and benefits affect the decision to apply
for DI among health impaired workers who have lost their jobs. Using a model of
job search and application for DI, I can show that UI benefits may influence the
DI application decision in two opposing ways. On the one hand, more generous
UI benefits decrease the immediate need for DI benefits, and thereby reduce the
likelihood that these workers apply for DI. On the other hand, UI benefits provide
potential applicants with income support during the application process, which
might be lengthy. Therefore, more generous UI benefits facilitate the application
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for DI. Given these competing hypotheses, the overall effect of UI benefits on the
application for DI remains ambiguous. Furthermore, a long waiting time for DI
benefits, coupled with the relatively short duration of UI benefits, may reduce the
magnitude of these channels towards zero. Concerning the UI take-up decision,
the act of claiming benefits itself might deter jobless workers from applying for
DI. For instance, UI claimants may worry that they are supposed to be able and
available for work, and therefore will not be eligible for DI benefits after picking
up UI benefits.
To empirically test these hypotheses, I construct spells of non-employment
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) covering the years
1990 to 2004. SIPP surveys are matched to Social Security DI application and
awards records in order to identify applications and their outcomes. Monthly un-
employment insurance benefit amounts (MB) are imputed for each worker using
state unemployment laws and prior earnings history. Focusing on workers who are
at risk of applying for disability insurance, I jointly estimate the hazard to disabil-
ity insurance application and UI take-up, allowing for correlated random effects
across these decisions. Results show that higher monthly UI benefits reduce the
hazard to DI application. Therefore, the insurance effect dominates. The effect
is sizable for those on UI. With respect to the UI take-up decision, claiming UI
benefits does not reduce the hazard to DI application in the absence of random
effects. However, when random effects are included, claiming UI benefits signif-
icantly reduces the hazard to DI application. The random effects are positively
correlated, which indicates that the unobserved components of transaction costs
associated with claiming UI benefits and applying for DI are positively related.
Studying how UI take-up and benefits influence the decision to apply for DI
contributes both to the literature on disability and on unemployment insurance.
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Previous models of DI application such as those devised by Halpern and Haus-
man (1986), Kreider (1999) or Lahiri et al. (2008) have primarily focused on how
long-term income flows affect application decisions. Potential applicants presum-
ably consider long-term income prospects when deciding whether or not to apply
for DI, since DI beneficiaries often stay in the program for several years. Black
et al. (2002) find supportive evidence that permanent and not short-term earning
shocks due to the coal boom and bust influence DI enrollment. However, their
study does not directly assess whether short-term income shocks affect application
decisions for DI, and they do not focus on the preceding transition from working
to not working. In contrast to these studies, Lando et al. (1979) and Rupp and
Stapleton (1995), among others, find a positive correlation between the rate of un-
employment and applications for disability insurance. As economic downturns are
often brief episodes, these findings suggest that short-term income shocks might
influence the application decision for DI as well.
This study addresses the question whether short-term cash income influences
application decisions by estimating how one major short-term determinant of in-
come for jobless workers, unemployment insurance, affects the application decision
for DI of workers who have a work limitation and who experienced a recent job
loss. Thereby, it builds on recent work by Autor and Duggan (2003), who em-
phasize that people with work limitations who still have some work capacity do
not consider applying for DI while employed. Once they lose their jobs, however,
they may apply for DI.1 The link between job loss and application for disabil-
ity insurance is of particular interest since it concerns workers at the margin of
applying for DI, those who do not consider applying when employed, but do so
after losing their jobs. Presumably, the application decision for these marginal
1Bratsberg et al. (2010) use administrative files from Norway to identify the causal effect of
job loss on application for DI, and find that a large proportion of disability insurance claims can
be directly attributed to job displacement.
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applicants is sensitive to current income. However, marginal applicants who lose
their jobs not only suffer from income loss, but also experience declining health
(Sullivan and Wachter, 2009), difficult long-term employment conditions (Bound
and Burkhauser, 1999), and are more likely to pass the initial earnings screen-
ing, which precludes DI applicants from engaging in any substantial work. It is
therefore not possible to conclude from correlations of job loss and subsequent
application for DI that short-term income shocks influence application decisions.
By connecting panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation to ad-
ministrative data on DI claims, this paper is able to show that UI benefits have a
negative effect on applications for DI.
This finding highlights that jobless marginal applicants are credit-constrained,
since they would otherwise not apply for DI benefits because of insufficient current
income.2 Thereby, this paper relates to studies which emphasize the beneficial role
of unemployment insurance in consumption (Gruber, 1997) or search behavior
(Chetty, 2008) of unemployed workers. This study expands on this literature
by suggesting that UI benefits may also affect the long-term labor supply for a
subgroup of jobless people with health problems. This is so because successful
applicants for DI almost always withdraw from the paid labor force for life.
The sensitivity of DI applications with respect to short-term income shocks also
relates to recent literature on productivity risks and insurance programs (see Low
and Pistaferri, 2010a,b). The common insight is that social insurance programs
offer only partial insurance against the productivity shocks they are designed for.
Therefore, changes to one social insurance program induces spill-overs to other
insurance programs, as found for instance by Duggan et al. (2007) for DI and
retirement in the United States and Borghans et al. (2010) for DI and other social
2While families generally are able to smooth consumption with respect to earnings changes
(Dynarski and Gruber, 1997), many unemployed workers are credit-constrained and therefore
have limited resources to smooth consumption (e.g. Card et al., 2007).
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assistance programs in the Netherlands. The results from this study suggest that
some workers apply for DI benefits as insurance against income shocks for which
the UI program is designed for, either because UI benefits are insufficient, or
because they do not claim UI benefits to begin with. Therefore, providing short-
term cash benefits to such marginal applicants could be an attractive policy to
reduce applications for DI. However, such policies can only be effective if the
population of potential DI applicants in need of short-term cash benefits can be
targeted. For instance, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that increasing
UI benefits for all UI claimants is not likely to be cost effective, due to the small
number of UI claimants who are likely to apply for DI.
The next section provides an overview of the two insurance systems. It is fol-
lowed by the theoretical discussion (section 2.3). Section 2.4 presents the econo-
metric approach, data, and results, and conclusions are given in section 2.5.
2.2 The Unemployment and Disability Insurance Systems
This section provides an overview of significant provisions of the Social Security
Disability Insurance (DI) and the Unemployment Insurance (UI) programs.
2.2.1 Social Security Disability Insurance (DI)
Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) is the largest federal insurance program
in the United States directed towards non-elderly disabled adults. In 2009, about
2.8 Million people applied for DI benefits, and 7.8 Million people were recipients
of DI benefits.3 Total benefits paid in 2008 amounted to $95 billion dollars. By
comparison, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families accounted for $17 billion in
3See SSA’s Publications at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/dibStat.html.
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2009. Beneficiaries are primarily older, less educated workers. For instance, Autor
and Duggan (2003) report that in 1999, more than 20 percent of men and more
than 15 percent of women aged 55 to 64 without high-school degrees received DI
benefits.
DI was enacted in 1956 to insure workers, as well as their spouses and depen-
dents, against loss of earnings due to disability by providing monetary transfers
and access to Medicare. In 1974, SSI for the Disabled and Blind was added as a
second program, aimed at disabled adults. Only applications for DI are considered
here since SSI applicants have very weak labor force attachment and therefore are
unlikely to be able to take up UI benefits. For both programs, disability is defined
as
(...) the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted, or can
be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.4
Medical eligibility criteria and the application determination process are the same
for both insurance programs, but their non-medical eligibility criteria are some-
what different. Eligibility for DI requires a recent and relatively steady work
history.5 Eligibility for SSI does not stipulate this work history, but people must
have income and assets below certain thresholds. Individuals can apply for both
programs if they meet all respective non-medical requirements.
Initial applications are determined through a sequential five-stage procedure.
4See See Title II of the Social Security Act, Section 223. [42U.S.C. 423], (d)(1)(A)
(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP Home/ssact/title02/0223.htm.)
5Specifically, workers need to be to be both disability-insured and fully insured in order
to be eligible for DI benefits. Workers aged 31 or older are disability-insured if they have
worked in Social Security-covered employment during 20 of the 40 quarters prior to their date of
disablement. They are fully insured if they have worked in covered employment for, on average,
one out of every four quarters between the year they turned 21 and the year before the year in
which they reached age 62 or became disabled.
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First, applicants must not have engaged in substantial gainful activity (SGA) since
disability onset, where SGA is defined as earning above a threshold.6 Transfer
income, such as UI benefits, is not considered for this earnings screen. The next
four steps determine whether the health condition is severe (step 2), whether it
is included in the list of disabling conditions (step 3), and, if not, whether the
person can do their previous work (step 4) or any other type of work (step 5).7
While the initial determination of claims is processed relatively quickly, about
two-thirds of them are declined (Szymendera, 2006). About one-third of initially
denied applicants appeal the decision, and two-thirds of appeals are successful for
the claimant. However, appeals often persists for a year or more.
In addition to the waiting time between application and determination of the
claim, Social Security’s rules and regulations also stipulate a five-month minimum
waiting period between disability onset and first benefit payment.8 This minimum
waiting period in combination with the SGA requirement mentioned above may
pose a problem to workers who have recently lost their jobs. If they earned above
SGA before job loss, they need to claim that their disability occurred simultane-
ously with losing their employment. In that case, they will have to wait for five
months before receiving DI benefits. One possible solution to this dilemma is the
so-called unsuccessful work attempt.9 If applicants changed or stopped their work
due to the impairment, they can earn above SGA for up to six months without
losing eligibility. This clause might allow jobless workers to date their disability
onset earlier than the time the job loss occurred. To what extent the five-month
6The amount is $1000 per month for the non-blind, and $1,640 for the blind in 2010. For a
list of past SGA levels see http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/sga.html.
7See http://www.ssa.gov/dibplan/dqualify5.htm for a description and Hu et al. (2001) for
an analysis of the initial determination.
8See Title II of the Social Security Act, Section 223. [42 U.S.C. 423], (c)(2)
(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP Home/ssact/title02/0223.htm).
9See Code of Federal Regulations, Title 20 – Employee’s Benefits, Chapter III – Social Secu-
rity Administration, Part 404, Section 1574
(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP Home/cfr20/404/404-1574.htm)
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waiting period binds is hard to gauge from regulations alone. It is an interesting
empirical question on its own which has not been addressed yet. Section 2.4 pro-
vides evidence that some DI beneficiaries received their first DI benefit payment
within five months after job loss.
DI benefits are calculated in the same way as retirement insurance benefits.
After calculating the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) from past earn-
ings, a piecewise linear formula is applied to obtain DI benefits, which is also
called the Principal Insurance Amount (PIA). The PIA is a concave function of
past earnings, i.e., workers with low past earnings are reimbursed a higher frac-
tion of their past earnings than workers with high past earnings. DI benefits are
substantial: the average wage earner in 2008 would receive more than $1,500 in
DI benefits per month, which is about 43 percent of average earnings in that year.
Appendix 2.6 details the computation of the PIA.
2.2.2 Unemployment Insurance (UI)
The unemployment insurance system was established as part of the Social Security
Act of 1935. It is a federal-state partnership to provide short-term cash benefits
to people who lost their jobs through no fault of their own. As such, the number
of claims varies strongly with the business cycle. For instance, the number of
claims doubled from 3 million to 6 million between June 2008 and June 2009.
Unemployed workers are eligible for unemployment benefits if they fulfill all
monetary and non-monetary eligibility criteria. Monetary entitlement requires
recent and sufficiently high wage earnings. All states except Massachusetts con-
sider the first 4 of the last 5 completed calendar quarters preceding the filing of
a claim as the base period, i.e. the period for which a claimant’s eligibility is
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determined.10 Wages during the base period must exceed a threshold set by the
states.
Non-monetary eligibility criteria address the initial reason for job separation,
and for ongoing claims, whether the claimant is able, available and seeking work.
Concerning reasons for separations, workers must have lost their job through no
fault of their own, i.e. either involuntarily, or voluntarily but with good cause.
Common good cause provisions include an illness. Therefore, a worker who left
a job because of a health impairment can still claim UI benefits. In some states,
claimants also remain eligible if they become ill or disabled after filing their UI
claim, as long as they do not refuse suitable work.11 Concerning able and avail-
able provisions, most states consider filing a claim and registering for work at a
public employment office as sufficient evidence. Unemployed workers may also be
monitored and considered not available for work if they refuse job offers. Some
states also require evidence that UI recipients actively seek work.12 Workers who
do not meet such requirements get their benefits reduced.
Each state uses a different formula to determine the weekly benefit amount of
UI claimants. Benefit formulas generally specify a minimum and maximum ben-
efit amount, as well as a replacement ratio – typically 50 percent – of past wage
earnings within these boundaries. The majority of states stipulate a week of wait-
ing, during which the claimant, while still eligible, does not receive any benefits.
Workers may also receive extended benefits during times of high unemployment,
which are regulated by the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation
Act of 1970. Extended benefits in a state are “triggered” if the state’s unemploy-
10Massachusetts uses the four quarters preceding a claim. Some states also consider periods
closer or further away from the filing date if the claimant does not fulfill eligibility criteria for
the regular base period.
11These are Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont.
12New York, for instance, requires claimants to document which employers they have contacted
(NYDL, 2010).
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ment rate exceeds certain thresholds.13 In such cases, unemployment benefits are
extended by up to 13 weeks for unemployed workers after their regular benefits
end. In addition, Congress may enact emergency extended benefits for all states
on an ad-hoc basis. There have been eight such extensions, with the latest three
from July 1992 to June 1993, March 2002 to December 2003, and the current
period, which started in July 2008.
To summarize, this overview of rules and regulations for DI and UI show that
the two programs are not mutually exclusive. The criteria for disability (DI) and
ability to work (UI) differ enough that workers with performance limitations —
especially those at the margin of applying for DI — may be considered not able
to perform substantial gainful activity under the DI program, while they could
be considered as able to work for UI purposes.14 Receiving UI benefits also does
not forfeit eligibility for DI, since such transfer income is not considered for the
earnings screen.
The primary reason why UI benefits might not affect the decision to apply
for DI is the timing of benefits. UI benefits are normally paid for only up to
six months. On the other hand, the often lengthy waiting time and five-month
minimum waiting period imply that DI benefits are often only paid several months
after applications are submitted. To understand how UI benefits can affect the
application decision for DI, and how the timing of benefit payments influences this
decision, the subsequent section develops a model of job search and DI application.
13Specifically, there are three conditions under which extended benefits are paid. First, if the
state’s rate of insured unemployed workers (IUR) — the average weekly individuals filing regular
claims divided by average monthly covered employment for the specified period — exceeds 5
percent for the past 13 weeks and had increased by more than 20 percent as compared to the
average IUR of the corresponding 13 weeks of the past two years. Second, if a state’s IUR had
exceeded 6 percent over the last 13 weeks. Third, if the average seasonally adjusted rate of total
unemployment in a state for the last 3 months equals or exceeds 6.5 percent, and the average rate
of seasonally adjusted total unemployment in the state for the 3-month period equals or exceeds
110 percent of such average rate for either (or both) of the corresponding 3-month periods of
the preceding 2 calendar years.
14To my knowledge, the respective agencies also do not communicate about ongoing claims.
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The model also allows me to discuss whether the decision to take up UI benefits
itself may affect the application decision for DI.
2.3 A Theory of Job Search and Application for DI
In this section, I analyze a model of job search and application for DI. The
model features failures in credit markets so that jobless workers cannot borrow
or save. I first describe the optimal search and DI application behavior, and then
discuss the role of UI benefits in the decision to apply for DI. Finally, the role of
UI take-up in the decision to apply for DI is discussed.
2.3.1 Optimal search and application for DI
Consider a discrete-time setting in which a worker is in the labor force until
retirement age T . All periods are measured in months. The worker discounts
future utility with factor β. Suppose that the worker initially has a job, but loses
it at age τ0. Each month t = 1, ... without work, the worker chooses search effort
s. Let p(st) be the probability of finding a job in period t if the worker searched
with effort st−1 during the previous month. The function p is strictly concave in
search effort s. I make the following assumptions to simplify the analysis: (i) the
worker takes the job offer, which eliminates reservation wage choices15; (ii) there
is no subsequent job destruction; and (iii) wage earnings wt remain fixed from the
period t the worker becomes re-employed until retirement.
Besides searching, the worker may also apply for disability insurance with
15Higher unemployment insurance increases unemployment duration, which either could in-
crease subsequent wage earnings because of better match quality, or decrease earnings if there
is a stigma effect to longer search. Empirically, Card et al. (2007) find no evidence that higher
UI benefits have a discernible effect on subsequent wages. The analysis therefore treats wages
as fixed.
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application effort a.16 After applying, the worker learns each month first about
a job offer, and then whether the application has been determined, which occurs
with probability q. Conditional on a decision being made, the worker is accepted
into the program with probability α(h). Better health h decreases the chance
of being accepted. If granted benefits, the worker receives disability benefits d.
For simplicity, I further assume that (i) health does not change over time, (ii) DI
beneficiaries remain in the program until retirement, and (iii) rejected applicants
cannot reapply for DI.
The worker can claim UI benefits with effort eu at the beginning of the first
month after job loss. Monthly income without UI benefits is normalized to zero,
and b > 0 while UI benefits are paid, for a duration of B months. UI benefits
are paid whether the worker receives DI benefits or not. In what follows, only
the scenario where claiming UI benefits is optimal is considered. The decision to
take-up UI benefits is analyzed in section 2.3.4.








u(wt) − ee(h) ,
]
(2.1)
where u(·) is the strictly concave period utility function, and ee(h) is the effort of
16These application costs include filling out forms, attending an interview by phone or in
person, and providing medical records. It is plausible that most costs of applying for DI are in
the form of non-monetary effort since applicants need not pay for their medical examination.
17At time t, the worker is of age (τ0+t−1), where τ0 is the age of job loss. Since heterogeneity
in age is not considered, the subsequent analysis treats non-employment duration t as the sole
state variable.
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working, which depends negatively on health h. Similarly, the value of receiving





βju(d + b · It≤B) , (2.2)
where It≤B = 1 if t ≤ B and zero otherwise, and the effort of being on disability
insurance is normalized to zero. As discussed in the previous section, DI benefi-
ciaries may also collect UI benefits, but the theoretical results would not change
substantially if they could not. The value of being a rejected applicant at time t
is defined recursively as











where srt is the optimal search effort of a rejected applicant at time t which results
in a probability prt+1(st) of finding employment in period t + 1. Optimal search
effort is determined by the first-order condition





The first-order condition states that the optimal level of search effort is chosen to
equate marginal search costs of 1 with the marginal value of searching.
The worker’s value of searching and not applying for DI at time t, conditional
on not having applied for DI yet, is
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t+1 + β(1 − p
s
t+1)Vt+1 , (2.4)
where sst is the optimal search intensity at time t and Vt is the value of non-
employment at time t if not having applied for DI yet.
Finally, the value of applying for DI at time t is
V at = u(b) − (s
a







qαV dt+1 + q(1 − α)V
r





where Ṽ at = V
a
t + a, since the worker has to incur application effort a only at
the time of application, and search effort does not depend on non-monetary costs.
Equation (2.5) shows that applying for DI is a lottery over future income.
Workers who have not yet applied for DI or are in the process of applying
for DI choose optimal search intensity as determined by the respective first-order
conditions:
1 = p′st β (V
e
t − Vt)




t + (1 − α)V
r
t ) − (1 − q)Ṽ
a
t )
Given value functions and optimal search effort, the Bellman equation for the
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optimization problem, which defined the value Vt of non-employment at time t of
a worker who has not yet applied for DI can be stated as follows:
Vt = max
{











t+1 + β(1 − p
s
t+1)Vt+1 ,







qαV dt+1 + q(1 − α)V
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Since optimal search intensity is higher if the net value of searching is higher,




t+1 if application for DI is optimal at time
t. The worker searches less when applying for DI, since the expected net value
from searching is lower. Rejected applicants search the most, since V rt+1 ≤ Vt+1.





2.3.2 The effect of higher UI benefits on the decision to apply for DI
To understand the channels through which UI benefits affect the decision to apply
for DI, consider a $1 increase in the benefit level b in period t + 1 only on the
value of not applying for DI at time t < B:
dV st
db
= β(1 − pst+1)u
′(b) . (2.7)
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The increase in UI benefits increases the value of not applying in period t, since
the worker might have to consume UI benefits in period t + 1. Next, consider the




= β(1 − pat+1)[αqu
′(d + b) + (1 − αq)u′(b)] . (2.8)
Combining these two equations shows the effect of a $1 increase in the UI
benefit level b on the net value of applying for DI, V at − V
s
t :




= β(1 − pat+1)[αqu
′(d + b) + (1 − αq)u′(b)] − β(1 − pst+1)u
′(b) (2.9)
Equation (2.9) shows that higher UI benefits affect the net value of applying
through two distinct channels. The first one is the insurance channel. Application
for DI increases expected income in period t+1. Since the utility function is strictly
concave, it follows that αqu′(d+b)+(1−αq)u′(b) < αqu′(b)+(1−αq)u′(b) = u′(b).
In other words, an increase in UI benefits increases both the expected value of
applying and not applying for DI. However, since DI applicants might receive
DI benefits, their expected value increases less than non-applicants. Therefore, a
$1 increase in UI benefits decreases the net value of applying for DI. The second
channel is a search effort effect. Since pat+1 < p
s
t+1 if applying is optimal at duration
t, an applicant is less likely to become re-employed. Therefore, the net value of
applying for DI increases in UI benefits through different search effort for those
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who apply for DI. Put differently, a worker with low UI benefits would prefer not
to apply for DI because applicants search less, and are therefore more likely to
depend on UI benefits in the near future.
Whether higher UI benefits increase or reduce the net value of applying for DI
depends on which of the two channels dominates. Proposition 1 states this result
formally.
Proposition 1: A $1 increase in UI benefit b at period t + 1 decrease the net
value of applying for DI in period t < B iff
αq
(









Multiple periods of UI benefits: In reality, UI benefits are paid up to six months, or
even longer during times of extended benefits. Therefore, a change in UI benefits
affects the value of applying for DI during multiple periods. The result from
proposition 1 essentially remains the same, as shown in appendix 2.7.1. The main
difference to proposition 1 is that higher UI benefits also affect the value of being
a denied applicant. Since denied applicants search the most, applying for DI
benefits increases the probability of being dependent on UI benefits in the near
future, but may decrease it later in the case of a denied application.
2.3.3 Institutional barriers
As mentioned in section 2.2, UI benefit duration and the waiting time until DI
benefits are paid might affect the magnitude of the effect of higher UI benefits on
the decision to apply for DI. First, consider the effect of a longer waiting time.
46
From the first-order conditions, it is evident that pat decreases if q increases, both
directly and indirectly through a higher value Ṽ at+1 of an ongoing application.
Search effort pst also decreases in q, but only through Vt+1. Therefore, as the
success probability becomes small, or the waiting time becomes long, pat increases
towards pst . Intuitively, if there is little chance of receiving disability insurance,
an applicant wants to search with the same intensity as if not applying. As a
consequence, the search effort effect becomes small. Moreover, if q is very small,
the insurance effect is negligible as well: from equation (2.9), it can be seen that
αqu′(d + b) + (1 − αq)u′(b) ≈ u′(b) in this case. Together, both effects get small
as α or q get close to zero, and dV a/db ≈ dV s/db. In words, a longer waiting
time reduces the magnitude with which both channels operate, since it is less
likely that the jobless worker will receive any DI benefits in the near future. As
a consequence, the net effect also becomes negligible. Appendix 2.7.2 provides a
formal proof that the net effect converges to zero as q approaches zero.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the effect of changes in the waiting time on the strength of
how UI benefits affect the decision to apply for DI.18 For the baseline scenario, the
model is simulated for an application success probability of α = .6, an application
processing probability of q = .6, and an UI benefit duration of six months. For
these values, the difference between the value of applying for DI and not applying
at all for the first month of the non-employment spell is taken for UI benefits
ranging from 1 to 5. The differences are normalized by the difference for b = 1.
As can be seen, the insurance effect dominates for the selected parameter values,
since the difference decreases in b. The model is then simulated again for a longer
waiting time, where q = .3. As can be seen from figure 2.1, the effect of higher
UI benefits on the net value of applying for DI is still negative, but less strongly
18The model is parametrized as follow: β = .99; T = 500; a = 1; d = 7; w = 10; e = 1;
b0 = .1; B = 26 weeks; p =
√
s/(50 max(s)); s ǫ [0; 30], and α = .6 and q = .6 for the baseline
scenario.
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than for the baseline scenario.
Duration of UI benefits has the same effect as the waiting time. If benefit
duration is small, then any changes to UI benefits only affect income for the next
several weeks, with little effect on the value of applying for DI relative to the value
of no applying. For instance, higher UI benefits in period t do not change the value
of applying versus not applying for period t. Figure 2.2 illustrates this intuition,
using the same parametrization as above. The effect of higher UI benefits on the
value of applying for DI relative to not applying is weaker for a benefit duration
of only 3 months as compared to a benefit duration of 6 months.
Together, a long waiting time for first DI payments in combination with a
short payment window for UI benefits imply that UI benefits are unlikely to affect
the decision to apply for DI. Intuitively, by the time DI benefits are first paid, UI
benefits have already stopped, and higher or lower UI benefits have little to no
effect on the application for DI. Conversely, if there is overlap in the timing of UI
and DI payments, UI benefits can influence the decision to apply for DI. To what
extent benefit payments overlap is an empirical question which will be addressed
in section 2.4.3.
2.3.4 UI take-up decision
The discussion so far has focused on how higher UI benefits may effect the decision
to apply for DI. However, workers who have lost their job must first claim UI
benefits in order to receive them. The decision whether or not to take up UI
benefits might affect the decision to apply for DI as well. As discussed in section
2.2, claiming UI benefits does not necessarily jeopardize an application for DI.
However, people who claim UI benefits might still worry that it reduces their
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chances of a successful DI application. To see this, it is assumed for simplicity that
no UI claimants are rejected. Suppose that the (perceived) application success
probability depends on whether the person has claimed UI benefits: α(UI) <
α(No UI). Clearly, claiming UI benefits would then reduce the net value of
applying.
Introducing the decision to claim UI benefits also suggests correlated take-up
and DI application behavior due to correlated application costs. Such application
costs include the act of filling out forms or making telephone calls, as well as any
discomfort or social stigma involved with these applications. Other studies have
shown that these costs, especially transaction costs, are important determinants
of take up rates (see Currie, 2004 : for an overview). Therefore, it is plausible that
correlated transaction costs also play an important role in the UI take-up and DI
application decision. For instance, a person might be more or less timid about
being dependent on transfer programs, in which case UI take-up and application
for disability insurance are positively correlated. Formally, this example would
imply that UI take-up costs eU and application costs a for applying for DI are
positively correlated. A worker with high eU is then also more likely to have
high application costs a, and will therefore be less likely to claim UI benefits and
apply for DI as compared to an observationally identical worker with low costs of
claiming UI benefits and applying for DI.
Summary and empirical implications: The above discussion suggests several links
through which UI benefits might affect the decision to apply for DI. Claiming UI
benefits in itself could reduce applications for DI if people worry that it diminishes
their application chances, or if they have to search more than they would like to as
applicants. For UI claimants, higher UI benefits might reduce applications for DI
since both programs provide cash benefits. However, it is also possible that higher
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UI benefits increase applications for DI because of lower search effort by DI appli-
cants. Furthermore, institutional factors for both programs may reduce any effect
of UI benefits on DI application to zero. The next section empirically assesses
whether there is a discernible effect of UI benefits, which channel dominates, and
whether the UI take-up decision affects applications for DI as well.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Estimation Strategy
The objective of the empirical analysis is to estimate how UI take-up and benefit
amount affect the decision to apply for disability insurance. To bridge from the
theoretical model to the empirical specification, a latent value approach is used.
To begin, suppose that the latent net value of applying for DI depends on observed












where t is the month of non-employment duration, log(λ0
t
) a duration-specific con-
stant, xD
t
are covariates influencing the disability insurance application, UI is a
dummy variable equals to one if the person received unemployment insurance for
at least one month, MB is the monthly benefit amount of unemployment insur-
ance, ζDr is a location point for type r of an unobserved heterogeneity distribution
with R types of individuals, and the error term εD measures random shocks to
the net value of applying for DI.
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The unobserved location points are a semi-parametric random effects speci-
fication, assumed to be uncorrelated with observed characteristics or the error
term. This approach was first advocated by Heckman and Singer (1984) as a
solution to the problem that parameter estimates from single-risk hazard models
with random effects are very sensitive to ad-hoc choices about the random effects
distribution. McCall (1996) applied the semi-parametric specification to a corre-
lated risk model. In the context of this study, the location points can be thought
of as a measure of the application effort or eligibility for DI, which is unobserved
to the econometrician, but may vary systematically across the population.
The latent net value of applying for UI is assumed to be linear in its parameters
as well. Since most of the people who take up UI do so in the first period, the net
value for UI take-up is specified for the first month of duration as follows:





′βU + MB δ3 + log(ζ
U
r ) − ε
U , (2.12)
where V U is the value of taking up UI, V o is the value of not taking up UI, xU
1
are covariates for the UI take-up decision at the first month of unemployment,
MB is the monthly UI benefit amount, and ζUr is a location point for type r for
unemployment insurance take-up. As in equation (2.11), ζUr can be interpreted
as unobserved costs of, or eligibility for, UI take-up. The error term εU measures
random shocks to the net value of UI take-up. It is assumed that ζD and ζU might
be correlated, but εD and εU are not.
Equations (2.11) and (2.12) can be used to demonstrate why endogeneity of
UI needs to be addressed. For simplicity, suppose that we could observe the net
value of DI application and UI take-up, and therefore be in the position to estimate
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equation (2.11) via OLS. Assume further that there are no other covariates xD
and xU. Then, the least-square estimate of γ can be expressed as follows:




where Cov(·) is the covariance, and Var(·) the variance. As discussed in section
2.3.4, it is plausible that UI take-up reduces the net value of applying for DI, i.e.,
that γ is negative. If the unobserved heterogeneity terms are correlated across
equations (2.11) and (2.12), then the estimate γ̂ is biased, because whether a
person takes up UI (i.e., whether UI = 1) depends on the net value V U1 − V
O
1 ,
which in turn depends on ζUr . For instance, suppose that costs for UI take-up
and DI application are positively correlated. This could be the case depending on
whether people are timid about receiving transfer programs. A person with low
costs of DI application (i.e., a high value of ζD) is then also more likely to have
low costs of UI take-up (i.e. a high value of ζU). It follows that Cov(ζDr ,UI) > 0.
Consequently, unobserved location parameters for DI application and UI take-
up that are positively correlated would result in a bias of γ̂ towards a positive
value. Conversely, if the correlation between the location parameters is negative,
the estimate of UI take-up would be biased towards a more negative value.
In order to address the endogeneity of UI take-up, the equations for DI appli-
cation and UI take-up will be jointly estimated. Since none of the net values are
observed, the latent index model first needs to be translated into a model that can
be estimated. To begin, note that the probability of observing a person taking up
UI can be rewritten as
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P (UI = 1|t = 1,xU
t
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where F (·) is the cdf for the error term. Assuming that F (·) is of the type I
extreme value distribution implies
P (UI = 1|t = 1,xU
t
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,
The same reasoning, applied to the net value of DI application, results in the
following equation for the probability that the person applies at duration t = T ,
provided that the person did not apply before:
P (T = t |T > t − 1, xD
t













Note that this specification of the probability of observing a worker apply for DI
at duration t = T is equivalent to a discrete-time proportional hazard rate to
disability insurance application with flexible baseline hazard λ0t .
The likelihood function is constructed using equations (2.13) and (2.14). Each
type r is represented in the population by a population fraction pr, where
∑R
r=1 pr =
1. The expected likelihood for an individual i is obtained by summing over the

























































where UIi is a dummy for receiving unemployment benefits and DIi is a dummy
for applying for DI. Equation (2.15) is the likelihood for a system of equations
with two equations and two endogenous variables, UI take-up and application for
19This likelihood pertains to a worker with a single spell of non-employment. For a worker

































































Identification: The substantial variation in UI benefits across states is used to
identify their causal effect on application for DI. Table 2.1 presents minimum
and maximum weekly benefit amounts and replacement rates for selected states.
For instance, the minimum weekly benefit amount ranges from $10 in Florida and
Louisiana to $75 in Washington. Since prior earnings are included in the model, UI
benefits for two jobless workers with the same prior earnings can only be different
if they reside in different states or in the same state at different times. Therefore,
identification requires that state-level variation in unemployment benefits is not
systematically related to unobserved characteristics of workers or states which
influence the application decision for DI.
If not through functional form, identification of the endogenous UI take-up
decision requires instruments and corresponding exclusion restrictions. I use sev-
eral instruments that are included in the UI take-up decision but excluded from
the hazard equation for DI application. The exclusion restriction requires that
these observed characteristics affect the application decision for DI only through
UI take-up. These instruments are and indicator that for whether or not a state
as a waiting week for UI benefits, whether claim interviews can be conducted per
telephone, and state-level able and available provisions. Conversely, the Princi-
pal Insurance Amount (i.e. DI benefits) is included in the hazard equation, but
excluded from the UI take-up decision. These exclusion restrictions are justified
since they pertain to separate and independent programs. Therefore, any charac-
teristics of the UI program have no direct effect on the DI application procedure
or outcome, and characteristics of the DI program do not directly influence UI
eligibility or benefit level.
Random effects are generally identified through variation in the outcome which
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cannot be accounted for by variation in observed characteristics. Since the causal
effect of UI take-up and application for DI are identified through the instru-
ments, the unobserved heterogeneity parameters and their correlation are identi-
fied through variation in the outcome which cannot be attributed to either instru-
ments or other regressors.
The waiting time and outcome of disability insurance applications are only
observed for those who apply for disability insurance. In order to include them,
they first would have to be imputed in separate regressions. Unfortunately, it
is problematic to find adequate instruments to identify these variables. While
state-level initial application success rates for DI applications are available, their
variation does not necessarily reflect variation in application determination prac-
tices across states. Strand (2002) shows that initial application success rates are
higher in states where economic conditions are better. Similarly, I found that
the initial state-level application success rate is negatively correlated with the
percentage of workers in a state who apply for DI, as well as state-level unemploy-
ment rates. These results suggests that state-level initial application success rates
reflect state-level variation in economic conditions, rather than different practices
by SSA offices. When economic conditions are good, only people with dire health
conditions apply for DI. These people also tend to have a good chance to be ac-
cepted into the program. Conversely, when economic conditions are difficult, many
people apply for DI, even though their health problems are not clear-cut. Due
to this selection issue, I abstain from imputing the waiting time and application
success probability.20
20Model estimates with imputed waiting time and application success probability do not
differ substantially from the ones presented here. It is also plausible that people with a lower
waiting time or a higher application success probability have unobserved characteristics which
are not correlated with regressors but affect both the application probability or waiting time and
application for DI. These correlated random effects would bias parameter estimates (Heckman,
1979). However, since the main model is estimated with the full sample, sample selection does
not constitute a threat to identify the effect of monthly UI benefits on application for DI.
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2.4.2 Data
The primary data source is the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) for the years 1990 to 2004. The SIPP is a nationally representative sam-
ple of individuals 15 years of age and older of the civilian non-institutionalized
population. People are interviewed once every four months, called a wave, for two
to four years. When interviewed, respondents are asked to provide information
about the preceding four months, called reference months. Connecting reference
months of different waves generates panels, from which spells of non-employment
following a job loss are identified.21 In addition to the core questionnaire, respon-
dents are asked detailed questions about various topics, which are called modules.
Several health modules provide information about work limitations, health sta-
tus, functional limitations, Activities of Daily Living (ADLs), and hospital stays
in the past year. Table 2.2 presents SIPP modules that include health indicators.
The second wave topical module also includes information about the main type
of work limitation for those who had indicated having a work limitation. Answers
were matched to the list of disabling conditions, specified in the so-called “Blue
Book” of the SSA.22 Applicants with work limitations included in the list of dis-
abling conditions are accepted into the DI program at the third step of initial
determination (see section 2.2.1). A more extensive discussion of the SIPP survey
and variables created for this analysis can be found in Appendix 2.8.
SIPP surveys are matched to administrative data files containing information
Sample selection based on unobserved characteristics does play a role when assessing the effect
of a longer waiting time or higher success chance on the probability to apply for DI. Kreider
(1999) provides a thorough discussion of this issue. However, these parameter estimates are of
secondary interest for this study.
21Panel surveys often suffer from seam bias, i.e. disproportionally large changes of responses
between waves and disproportionally small changes of responses within waves. Seam bias is not
a concern in this context because of the use of administrative information. Therefore, neither
the date of DI application nor UI benefits suffer from a seam bias.
22See http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/AdultListings.htm.
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about disability insurance applications. Application dates are identified through
so-called 831 files, which track initial applications including the reconsideration
stage. For appeal decisions, Master Beneficiary Records (MBR) and Payment
History Updates (PHUS) data are used to correct application end dates and the
final application determination decision. Administrative data sources and match-
ing procedures are described in Appendix 2.8. Access to these administrative data
is restricted and subject to approval by the Social Security Administration, the
Census Bureau, and a federal fellowship. Due to the confidential nature of admin-
istrative data, all of the analysis involving this data was conducted at completely
secured work stations in SSA’s research department in Washington, D.C.
Estimation of the model requires information on UI benefits for those who
receive and those who do not receive benefits. Reported unemployment benefits
are problematic because of reporting bias (Meyer et al., 2008), and insufficient
because those who do not receive UI do not report their potential benefits. In
order to circumvent these issues, I follow Gruber (1997) in computing UI benefits
by using UI laws from the Employment and Training Administration’s Significant
Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws (various years) from the De-
partment of Labor.23 I use Social Securities’ Detailed Earnings Records (DER)
for benefit calculations.24 Besides unemployment insurance benefits, additional
state-level variables for able and available provisions are added to the sample,
based on the documentation provided by the US Department of Labor’s “Com-
parison of State UI Laws”.25 Some states also require UI recipients to actively
23See http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp.
24Average earnings for workers in the sample in the years before their jobless spell are stable
and slightly increasing. This gives me confidence that the earning records used are close to the
earnings used by State agencies to compute unemployment insurance benefits. The correlation
between imputed and reported unemployment benefits is about 0.8 in the sample. Reported
unemployment benefits tend to be somewhat lower than imputed, which is consistent with
under-reporting of these benefits.
25For years 2001 and later, documents are available from the Department of Labor’s website
http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp. Daniel Hays from the Department
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seek employment, and others explicitly state that UI claimants remain eligible if
they become ill or disabled, as long as they do not refuse suitable work.
Furthermore, potential DI benefits (i.e. the Principal Insurance Amount, or
PIA) are computed for each person and year, where the Detailed Earnings Records
(DER) provide past earnings. The computation of the PIA is explained in Ap-
pendix 2.6. Furthermore, state-level unemployment rates from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics are included in the model, as well as state-level initial application
success rates for DI applications using three sources: the Lewin group for the
years 1989 to 1995, Burkhauser, Butler, Weathers, and Houtenville for 1996 to
2000, and SSA for the years 2001 and later.26
After these imputations, a sample of workers who lost their job and who are
both eligible for DI and UI is selected. Table 2.3 presents the selection steps.
First, people who did not disclose their SSN (they cannot be matched to admin-
istrative records), who apply only for SSI (they are unlikely to qualify for UI
benefits because of low labor force attachment), and who were in the military are
disregarded. After these preliminary steps, workers who had lost their job at least
once during the SIPP survey are selected. Next, workers are selected who are
eligible for DI because of their past work history (i.e., who have positive earnings
5 of the last 10 years) and who report a work limitation at least once during the
survey period. Furthermore, workers who are not eligible for UI because of too low
earnings are disregarded. Finally, people on short-term layoff, people who receive
pensions or are turning 62 during a spell, and disrupted spells are disregarded.27
People who quit their job remain in the sample, since they can both receive UI
of Labor made available earlier years of these documents.
26Richard Burkhauser provided the first two datasets, which were used
in Burkhauser et al. (2002b). SSA’s award rates can be found at
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/disability/data/ssa-sa-mowl.htm.
27Disrupted spells are spells for which at least one wave is missing. They account for about
3 percent of all spells.
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and apply for DI, as corroborated by table 2.4. These selection steps leave 5,398
people in the sample. The Appendix 2.8 provides a detailed explanation of these
selection steps.
2.4.3 Results
Sample description: Table 2.5 presents summary statistics of the sample. Mone-
tary values are in thousands of 1990 dollars, in this and all subsequent tables. The
average age is 40 years, about five years older than in other unemployment studies.
In more than 80 percent of all months included in the sample, workers indicate
a work limitation. During the majority of months, no problems with Activities
of Daily Living or Functional Limitations are reported, but in 40 percent of the
months, two or more ADLs are indicated. These indicators show that the people
in the sample generally have health problems, but the majority are not fully in-
hibited from all kinds of work. The majority of people (66%) find employment,
whereas about 10 per cent of the spells end with an application for disability
insurance.28 The remaining spells (about one-quarter) are right-censored. The
observed average spell duration is 7.3 months, which is relatively high.29 How-
ever, jobless duration is significantly right-skewed, and the median spell duration
is 5 months. Workers take up UI benefits in 25 percent of all non-employment
spells.
Figure 2.3 presents the Kaplan-Meier hazard rate to disability insurance appli-
cation for a 15 month duration. The hazard rate exhibits a slight downward trend,
28The percent of spells ending with an application for DI is smaller than the percent of people
applying for DI due to multiple spells.
29Due to right-censoring, the actual spell duration is even longer. In addition, spells “ending”
with disability insurance application can be considered as not not ending for the purpose of
measuring spell durations until a final determination has been reached and the person has been
approved for DI, or until a rejected applicant has found employment again. I have calculated
spell duration using this alternative definition of spell endings as well. The average spell duration
is in this case with 7.57 months slightly higher (the median duration remains 5 months).
60
starting at more than 1.5 percent and decreasing to 1 percent after 15 months.
It appears that the hazard rate increases somewhat during the sixth and seventh
months, followed by a drop afterward.
An important result from the theoretical discussion (section 2.3.3) is that
UI benefits may only affect DI application decision is there is sufficient overlap
between the timing of benefit payment. With respect to UI claims, figure 2.4
displays the distribution of UI recipients over the duration of non-employment
spells. Not surprisingly, workers are the most likely to receive UI benefits from
the first to the seventh month of non-employment. However, the figure also shows
that the distribution is substantially right-skewed. Even after more than a year
without work, about 10 percent of all workers claim UI benefits.30 With respect to
DI benefits, table 2.5 shows that while the average waiting time for DI applications
is 6.7 months, half of them are processed in a bit more than 3 months, and
three-quarters in less than 6 months. The waiting times are roughly comparable
to those found by Lahiri et al. (2008) and Benitez-Silva et al. (1999).31 Table
2.6 presents the cumulative distribution of the first DI payment among those
who have successfully filed an application by the number of months into spells
of non-employment. As can be seen, 16 percent of all DI beneficiaries in the
sample receive their first payment within 5 months of being without employment.
Apparently, the 5-month minimum waiting time is not binding for these workers.
Table 2.7 presents numbers, cells and row percentages for UI take-up and the
30Three reasons can explain this result. First, not all workers who claim UI benefits do so
in the first month (about 80 percent of UI claimants claim benefits in the first two months).
Second, extended benefits increase the number of months for which workers are eligible for UI
benefits. Third, workers with UI benefits are less likely to become re-employed, and therefore
remain longer in the sample.
31Lahiri et al. (2008) find an average waiting time of only 3 months using SIPP surveys 1990-
1996. Benitez-Silva et al. (1999), using the Health and Retirement Survey, report a waiting time
of 4.8 months until benefits are first paid for successful applications at initial determination, but
an average waiting time of 15 months for successful applications at reconsideration and appeal.
Averaging over both groups implies a mean waiting time of 8.5 months.
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application for DI. As can be seen, in only 1.55 percent of all transitions are UI
take-up and application for DI observed together. While the overlap is small, the
number of cases (126) is large enough to estimate the effect of UI take-up on the
application decision for DI. The small overlap is also not evidence that UI benefits
have no effect on DI applications. To the contrary, if people consider UI and DI
benefits as a substitute for one another, then one would expect to see few people
receiving both.
Model estimates: Tables 2.8 and table 2.9 summarize the model results. All model
estimations include demographic characteristics as listed, including dummy vari-
ables for calendar years, with 1990 as the reference year, and industry dummies.
Due to the state-level instruments for UI take-up, the model does not use state
fixed-effects but rather dummy variables representing Census divisions, with di-
vision I as the reference group.32 Block bootstrapped standard errors with states
as blocks are used for all regression models.
Table 2.8 presents estimates of the model as shown in equation (2.15). Model
(1) pertains to estimates for which no unobserved heterogeneity between UI take-
up and application for DI is assumed. As expected, having a work limitation and
a higher principal insurance amount (PIA, i.e., DI benefits) increases the hazard
to DI application. Having higher past monthly earnings and higher earnings of a
spouse decreases the hazard to DI application. The estimate for the unemployment
rate is positive, but very imprecisely estimated. The large standard errors suggest
that there is substantial heterogeneity in how different rates of unemployment
32The Census divisions are as follows: Division 1: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont; Division 2: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania; Division
3: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; Division 4: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota; Division 5: Delaware, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Mary-
land, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia; Division 6: Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Tennessee; Division 7: Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; Division 8: Ari-
zona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, Wyoming; Division 9: Alaska,
California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington.
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affect search success.
Estimates for UI take-up generally have the expected direction. Work lim-
itation, past monthly earnings before job loss, spousal earnings, and a waiting
week all decrease the probability of taking up UI. A higher unemployment rate
and higher potential monthly UI benefits both increase the probability that the
worker claims UI. Able and available provisions do not seem to matter, except
for states which have an actively seeking work provision, which deters UI claims
somewhat. Finally, those who apply for DI are significantly less likely to take up
UI benefits.
Turning to the primary coefficients of interest, of those who have take up UI, a
higher monthly benefit amount (MB) reduces the hazard to DI application. The
effect appears to be large, and is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent
level. This result suggests that the insurance channel dominates the search effort
channel, and that the waiting time is not a prohibitively strong barrier. The
estimate for monthly UI benefits of those not receiving UI benefits is insignificant,
which provides a supportive counterfactual result. For if other state-level factors
correlated with the UI benefit level and DI application success were not controlled
for, then the main effect of UI benefits would not be zero.
Concerning UI take-up, the estimate of the dummy variable of UI receipt on
application for DI in the first model is slightly negative and not significant. This
result would indicate that people do not worry that taking up UI forfeits their
eligibility for DI, or that non-monetary eligibility requirements for UI claimants
do not reduce the value of applying for DI. However, the estimate for UI take-up
might not only measure the causal effect of UI take-up itself, but also correlated
costs or eligibility between UI take-up and application for DI. To address this
concern, we now turn to the second model.
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The second model, in table 2.8, allows for a correlated response between the
DI application and the UI take-up in the form of semi-parametric random effects.
The number of types is selected using the BIC criterion.33 Models with three
types, reported in this table, had the lowest BIC value for this model. The
share of people in the three different groups is estimated to be relatively equal,
and the correlation between the unobserved types is 0.99. This implausibly high
correlation is an artifact of two of the three location parameters being relatively
close together. The correlation drops to about 0.55 for models with four or more
types.34
Comparison of model (1) and model (2) reveals that most parameter estimates
change little. However, the coefficient for UI take-up becomes significantly neg-
ative. Likewise, the coefficient for DI application in the UI take-up decision is
now much more negative as compared to the first model. This result suggests
that one group of people is more likely to apply for DI and to take-up UI, while
the other group is less likely to do both. As reasoned in the theoretical section,
such a positive relationship could be explained by the correlated costs of taking
up UI benefits and applying for DI, or by correlated eligibility. For each group, UI
take-up is associated with a lower hazard to DI application, but this relationship
is obscured by correlated preferences or eligibility.
The estimate of UI take-up γ can be understood as a local average treatment
effect (LATE) of those applicants for DI who are induced to apply due to variation
in the instruments (e.g. Angrist, 2001). Since the instruments are state-level varia-
tion in UI eligibility and accessibility, the effect pertains to workers who receive UI
benefits versus those who do not because of these characteristics. Unfortunately,
33The formula for the BIC is −2 ln(L) + k ln(N), where L is the maximized value of the
likelihood function of the estimated model, k is the number of free parameters, and N is the
number of observations.
34For two or more types, parameter results change only slightly when the model is estimated
with different numbers of types.
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instruments are not significant. For a first-stage linear-probability regression of UI
take-up on the regressors used in the UI take-up equation, using the first month
only, the F-statistic of the hypothesis that all instruments are zero is only 3.5.
Therefore, instruments are weak and the local average treatment effect is likely
to be biased.
In order to investigate whether UI benefits have different effects at different
durations of the unemployment spell, the model is also estimated with duration-
specific estimates of UI benefits for the hazard to DI applications. From the
theoretical discussion, one would expect that parameter estimates of UI monthly
benefits for earlier months, where the duration of UI benefits is longer, would be
larger in magnitude. Table 2.9 reports the results from a model with duration-
specific effects of monthly benefits. There is no clear change in the parameter
values over duration.
Robustness Checks: In order to validate the result that higher UI benefits reduce
the hazard to DI application, several robustness checks are considered. First,
auxiliary regressors from model (1) and (2) in table 2.8 (spousal earnings, ex-
tended benefit periods and maximum UI benefit duration) are consistent with the
hypothesis that higher UI benefits reduce the hazard to DI application. Higher
spousal earnings function as income support similar to UI benefits, and reduce
the hazard to DI application. For the maximum benefit duration and extended
benefits, note that the net value of applying for DI, and therefore the hazard to
DI application, decreases in B if the insurance effect dominates.35
35In addition, one would expect the effect of MB on the hazard to DI application to be larger
in magnitude during extended benefit periods or for states with a longer maximum benefit
duration. Unfortunately, further interactions with extended benefit periods do not support this
hypothesis: MB interacted with extended benefit periods is not significant. It should be noted
though that the effect of higher MB on UI take-up is insignificant as well. Therefore, it is
questionable whether the current research format and sample size is able to properly identify
different effects for periods with and without extended benefits separately.
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Second, identification of the causal effect of UI monthly benefits on the hazard
to DI application assumes that state UI monthly benefit levels and their changes
are not correlated with other factors affecting applications for DI. One might
suspect that states with favorable economic conditions have high UI replacement
rates and fewer applications for DI. However, estimates for UI benefits are robust
to inclusion of state-level initial application success rates for DI (see table 2.10).
The state-level initial application success rate itself is negatively associated with
the hazard to DI application, consistent with the notion that it proxies economic
conditions.
Third, the model does not include state fixed-effects since they would prevent
using time-invariant state-level variation in UI programs as instruments for the UI
take-up decision. Focusing on those workers who received UI benefits allows for
estimation of a hazard model with state fixed-effects. Table 2.11 presents the re-
sults for three different specifications. In the first column, the model is estimated
without state fixed-effects and with clustered standard errors at the sample unit
level.36 Again, the effect of higher UI benefits is negative and significant. Intro-
ducing state fixed-effects in the second column does not change the size of the
estimate. Therefore, state-level variation in UI benefits is not correlated with
other state characteristics related to DI applications. However, the standard er-
ror increases slightly because of the 50 more parameters in the model. Finally,
using clustered standard errors on the state level as shown in the third column
increases the standard error for the UI monthly benefit amount further. These
different specifications show that variation in UI benefits across states and over
time correctly identify the effect of UI benefits on application for DI. However,
the correlated nature of imputed UI benefits within states reduces the power of
36For this specification, clustered standard errors are used since resampling using states as
blocks is unsuccessful.
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rejecting the null hypothesis.
Table 2.12 uses different model specification for the same individuals. For
these cross-sectional models, only the first month of non-employment spells is
used. The columns show results from linear probability and logit models with
and without state fixed-effects. As before, the effect of monthly UI benefits does
not change much when state-level fixed effects are introduced, but the standard
error for monthly UI benefit amount increases.
As a fourth robustness check, a SUR variation of the model is estimated.
The model is estimated without the state-level instruments and the interaction
between UI take-up and the UI monthly benefit amount. Error terms of the two
equations are still allowed to be correlated. Table 2.13 presents results of this
model. As expected, the coefficient for UI monthly benefits is still negative, but
reduced in magnitude. It is the average effect of UI monthly benefits on the hazard
to DI application of those who take up and who do not take up UI benefits. The
coefficient is imprecisely estimated, however.
The final specification (table 2.14) shows the same model as in table 2.8, but
with a slightly different specification of the the maximum UI benefit duration.
State UI law for maximum UI benefit duration in combination with past earnings
is used to calculate the maximum UI benefit duration for each individual. The
coefficient for this variable is negative and significant. This indicates that also
higher UI benefit duration might reduce the probability that unemployed, health
impaired workers will apply for DI.
Quantitative implications: The coefficients in a proportional Cox Hazard model
represent changes in the log of the hazard rate if the dependent variable changes
by one unit. For instance, a one-unit increase in the Principal Insurance Amount
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in table 2.8 implies a .913 increase in the log of the hazard rate. This is equivalent
to an exp(.913) = 2.5 ratio of the new hazard rate compared to the old hazard
rate, or a 150% increase. Since all monetary variables are in dollar variables, a
one-unit increase in the PIA represents an increase of $1,000. The coefficient for
the interaction term of the UI monthly benefit amount with UI take-up has about
the same absolute size in the opposite direction.
In order to convert these marginal effects into elasticities, the average elasticity
for the PIA and UI monthly benefits is calculated. To do so, I first compute hazard
rates to DI application for each person and each month, using parameter estimates
from the first model. If unobserved heterogeneity is considered, probabilities to
take up UI benefits are also estimated. In this case, hazard rates and UI take-up
probabilities are re-estimated until convergence is achieved.
From table 2.15, the elasticity for the Principal Insurance Amount is 0.672,
while the elasticity of the UI monthly benefit amount is 0.094. The difference in
the elasticities despite similar coefficients stems from the fact that only a quarter
of the people in the sample receive UI benefits. Indeed, under the assumption
that all people received UI benefits, the elasticity of MB is similar to the elasticity
of PIA. 37
Do these estimates imply that increasing UI benefits is cost-effective? Some
simple calculations show that this is unlikely to be the case. For that, I first
calculate the probability that a worker in the sample files an application over the
course of a 9-month spell for current UI benefits, and then again for 10 percent
37To understand how the computed elasticities are related to the parameter estimates, recall
that the average PIA is 0.672 in thousand 1990 U.S. dollar in table 2.5. For a worker with an
average PIA, a one percent increase in the PIA is equal to $6.72 dollar, or $0.00672 thousand
dollar increase. Multiplying 0.00672 by the percentage change of a one-unit increase in the PIA,
150%, implies an increase in the hazard rate of about 1%. For the average worker, therefore,
the elasticity is about 1. Workers with a lower PIA have a lower elasticity, while workers with
a higher PIA have a higher elasticity than 1. Since the distribution of the Principal Insurance
Amount is right-skewed, the average elasticity is smaller than the elasticity for the average PIA.
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higher UI benefits. In the sample, 13.38 percent apply for DI. This corresponds
to an average hazard rate of 1.58%. The above elasticity estimates of 0.15 to 0.2
suggest that for a 10% increase in UI benefits, the hazard rate to DI application
will drop by at most 2 percent, or to 1.55 percent. The smaller hazard rate implies
that no less than 13.1 percent of the sample would apply for DI, which is a 0.3
percentage point decrease.38
Actuarial Tables from the Social Security Administration show that between
2000 and 2008, about 2 million people applied for DI.39 Assuming that all of
them would face transitions from working to not working as in the sample for this
study, a 0.3 percent decrease in applications amounts to 6,000 fewer applications
per year. On average, no more than half of applications during this time were
successful. Therefore, the 10 percent increase in UI benefits would reduce the
number of beneficiaries by 3,000 per year.
In von Wachter et al. (2010) (web appendix), estimates are presented for the
present-discounted value of DI for an average new male and female beneficiary
in 1997. These estimates are based on average duration in the DI program, as
well as cash and Medicare benefits. They also include the indirect costs of the DI
program in the form of lost earnings. If between half and two-third of the new
beneficiaries are men, the average PDV of a new beneficiary is between $173,406
and $175,127 in 1997 dollars, or between $191,000 and $193,000 in 2001 dollars.
Therefore, 3,000 less beneficiaries would amount to $575 to $580 million of saved
benefits paid and more wages earned.
While substantial, these reduced costs are only a fraction of the costs due to
higher UI benefits. Between 2000 and 2008, an average of more than 2.5 million
38Note that the probability of not applying during a spell of 9 months is (1 − λ)9, where λ is
the hazard rate to DI application. Therefore, 1 − (1 − λ)9 is the probability that a worker will
apply during a 9-month interval.
39See http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/dibStat.html.
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workers were insured unemployed, i.e. received unemployment insurance.40 Given
an average benefit amount of $200 per week in 2001 dollars, a 10 percent increase
in UI benefits amounts to $20 higher expenses per claimant per week, or $2.5
billion higher yearly expenses for 2 million claimants. This is more than 4.5 times
as high as the savings due to fewer applicants. Moreover, these estimates are likely
to be conservative, since not all of the 2 million yearly applicants for DI might
face a situation similar to the workers selected for this study, and the indirect
costs of longer UI duration because of higher UI benefits are not considered.
The quantitative implications for extending UI benefits are different. An in-
crease of the maximum UI benefit duration by one month is equal to a 16.67
percent increase and translates into the same percentage reduction in the DI haz-
ard rate, since the elasticity is −0.927. This implies a decrease in the number of
applicants from 13.38 to 11.1 percent, or a 2.28 percent decrease. Using the same
numbers as above results in a decrease in the number of applicants by 45,000, or
a reduction on overall costs of $4.3 billion. In this case, therefore, the savings due
to fewer DI applications are substantial.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates how unemployment insurance benefits affect the deci-
sion to apply for disability insurance. Theoretical considerations suggest that an
increase in unemployment benefits reduces the value of applying for DI through
an insurance channel, but increases the value of applying for DI through a search
effort channel. Furthermore, institutional barriers, such as a long waiting period
or short UI benefit duration, reduce the magnitude of both channels. Besides UI
40The number of insured unemployed workers are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank for
St.Louis.
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benefits, the decision to receive UI may reduce the value of applying for DI, if
people worry that it reduces their chances for a successful application.
My empirical results indicate that higher UI benefits do indeed reduce the
hazard to DI application. The quantitative effect is also sizable for those who
receive UI benefits. These results imply that short-term income transfers such
as unemployment insurance have an influence on the decision to apply for DI.
Furthermore, introducing unobserved heterogeneity into the model suggests that
the UI take-up itself reduces the hazard to DI application.
Although this paper has focused on the role of unemployment insurance take-
up and benefits on DI applications, its results may be used more broadly to
understand the role of income flows and cash transfers on the decisions of marginal
applicants. For instance, this paper has emphasized that application decisions for
DI appear to be much more sensitive to even short-term cash incentives than has
been previously acknowledged, at least among health impaired workers who have
lost their jobs and who rely on short-term cash assistance such as UI benefits.
Providing cash and other assistance for such workers could be a promising policy
approach. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that increasing UI benefits
might not be cost-effective, but increasing the maximum UI benefit duration might
be.
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2.6 Appendix: Computation of the Principal Insurance
Amount
Computation of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) follows Social Security’s
rules and regulations for benefit calculation (Code of Federal Regulations, Part
404, Subpart C) and proceeds in two steps. First, Average Indexed Monthly
Earnings (AIME) are obtained. Second, these are used to calculate the PIA.
For the first step, taxable earnings subject to Social Security benefits from the
Detailed Earnings Records (DER) for each year are used. All earnings in excess
of the taxable maximum in a particular year are truncated at the maximum.
These earnings are then re-expressed as average monthly earnings. The AIME of














where Yτ are the person’s average monthly earnings in year τ , which are inflated
to current dollars by the average wage in the United States economy two year’s
prior to the year of interest, (Y t−2), divided by the average wage rate in year τ .
In addition, on-fifth of the years with the lowest earnings, to a maximum of five
years, are disregarded.



















0.9 · AIME if AIME ǫ [0 , b1]
0.9 · AIME + 0.32 · (AIME − b1) if AIME ǫ [b1, b2]
0.9 · AIME + 0.32 · (AIME − b1) + 0.15 · (AIME − b2) if AIME > b2
where the “bend points” b1 and b2 are rescaled every year by the average wage
growth of the economy. Average wages and bend points can be found in the
Annual Statistical Supplement of the Social Security Administration.
2.7 Appendix: Proofs and Generalization of the model
2.7.1 Generalization of proposition 1 for multiple-period change of UI
benefits
Consider a $1 increase in UI benefits for all months t = 1, ..., B. For simplicity,
the value of applying at period t = 1 is compared to the value of not applying
throughout the months benefits are paid. Then, the derivative of the value of not









Since bk = bl = b, for all k, lǫ[1, B], the derivative of the value of not applying














u′(b) = P s1 u
′(b) . (2.16)
For the value of applying for DI at time t = 1, three possibilities need to be
distinguished for each period kǫ[1, B]: (i) no determination has been made; (ii)
the application was denied; and (iii) the application was approved. A denial or
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The probability P a1,k pertains to the case that no decision is reached until
period k, and the worker is still without employment. The other two probabilities
are for the case that a decision has been reached, either in favor (P a2,k) or against
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(P a3,k) the applicant. Summing up the derivatives of the value of applying at t = 1
for k = 1, ..., B yields the following expression:
dV a1
db
= P a1 u
′(b) + P a2 αu




















Combining equation (2.16) and equation (2.17), and rearranging terms, it then
















2.7.2 No Effect of UI benefits if the waiting time becomes large
The first step is to show that P a2 and P
a
3 approach zero when the waiting time
goes to infinity. For that, note that for any finite k, limq→0(1− q)
k → 1. Consider
first the case that k = 2. If follows directly that P as,2 → 0 as q → 0, since
limq→0 q(1 − q) = 0 and the probabilities of finding re-employment are bounded
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by 1. Furthermore, since (1 − q) ≥ (1 − q)k for any finite k ≥ 1 and q ≤ 1, it
follows that P a2,k → 0 as q → 0 for any finite k. Therefore, P
a
2 → 0 as q → 0, and,
by the same reasoning, P a3 → 0 as q → 0.
Since limq→0(1 − q)
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1 . To show this, consider the value of
waiting for the outcome of the DI application when q → 0 is
lim
q→0
Ṽ at = max
st+1
{
u(b) − st+1 + βp(st+1)V
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This is the same maximum problem as for the value of not applying at time






















2.8 Appendix: Data description and sample selection
Survey of Income and Program Participation The SIPP core survey in-
cludes the following variables: age, gender, race, marital status, whether the
spouse works, earnings of spouse, education, employment status, UI take-up,
Worker’s Compensation take-up, number of people in the household, whether
the household has children under 18 years, and work limitation (SIPP 1996 and
later).
The dummy for being white is equal to one if the person indicates being white,
and zero otherwise. Marital status is one if the person has a spouse at home or
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currently not at home. A person is considered to have a high school degree if
she or he completed 12 years of school. See Jaeger (1997) for recommendations
on recoding education questions. The variable “Some college” is equal to one if
the person has more than 12 years of education. A month of non-employment is
a month during which the person has been without a job for at least one week,
including temporary layoffs, but excludes weeks of being absent from work. UI
and Worker’s Compensation take-up are equal to one if the person received a
respective income transfer during a spell. The work limitation variable is asked in
every core questionnaire beginning with the 1996 SIPP, but in the first wave and
for selected health modules beforehand (see table 2.2). In both cases, the variable
is one if the person ever indicated a work limitation.
In health modules of the second wave, respondents who indicated a work lim-
itation were asked to name the disability category of their primary limitation.
The answer is matched to impairments listed in Social Securities’ “Blue Book” in
order to create a dummy variable “Limitation on list of impairments”. General
health has five scales, from which five dummy variables are created. Functional
Limitations include difficulties to see, to hear, to speak, to lift 10 lbs., to walk
stairs, and to walk a quarter of a mile. Activities of Daily Living include having
any difficulty to take a bath or shower, to get dressed, to eat, and to use the toilet.
For these two health measures, dummy variables for numbers up to four of affir-
mative answers are created. The dummy variable “Person had been to hospital”
indicates whether the person was a patient in a hospital during the last year. For
waves not covered by health modules, the most recent answer is imputed. For
waves before the first health module, the answers of the first health module are
imputed.
77
Administrative records Administrative records include the so-called 831 files,
the Master Beneficiary Records (MBR), the Payment History Updates (PHUS),
Supplemental Security Earnings (SSR) and Detailed Earnings Records (DER).
The 831 files identify applicants and their date of filing a claim. They contain
information about initial determination up to the reconsideration stage. This
information is augmented for people who appeal an initial denial. Appeal decisions
as well as benefit payment information are contained in the MBR and PHUS
records for DI applicants, and in the SSR records for SSI applicants. They are
used to correct the application determination date and, potentially, the application
decision for such appeals. SSR records are used because some applicants for DI
also apply for SSI. These applicants are kept in the sample, while those who apply
exclusively for SSI are excluded from the sample. After matching 831 files to MBR,
PHUS and SSR records, they are matched to SIPP surveys. Detailed Earnings
Records (DER) contain yearly information about wage earnings and tips, as well
as whether they are covered by Social Security. All records are matched using
Social Security numbers (SSN).
UI benefits and UI law: UI benefits are imputed using state laws and earnings
records from the Detailed Earnings Record. The maximum earnings during the
year in which the spell began and the preceding year are used to compute UI
benefits.
For the variables “Suitable Work” and “Usual Work”, three different dummy
variables are created: whether a state requires UI claimants to accept any work,
suitable work, or usual work. Since the three categories are mutually exclusive,
the dummy variable for any work is used as a reference category. If the variable
“Actively Seeking” equals one, it means that a state requires UI claimants to
provide evidence that they are seeking employment. The variable “Disability
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Provision” equals one if a state declares that UI claimants who become ill or
disabled after having filed their claim remain eligible as long as they do not refuse
suitable work. The variable “Telephone Interview” equals one if claims can be filed
via telephone, and the variable “Waiting Week” equals one if there is a waiting
week during which eligible UI claimants do not receive benefits.
Monetary eligibility is determined using past earnings as for UI benefits im-
putation and UI state laws on past earnings requirements. If earnings exceed the
threshold set by the state in a given year, the person is considered eligible based
on the monetary criteria.
Sample selection: Table 2.3 presents all selection steps with corresponding
sample sizes. The starting sample is the universe of 258,130 people from SIPP
panels from 1990 to 2004 who were between 20 and 65 years old for at least one
wave of a survey. As a first step, people who did not disclose their SSN are
disregarded. Next, people who have been in the army are eliminated, as well as
those who applied, are applying, or will apply for Social Security for the Disabled
and Blind (SSI) alone. As a last step of the preliminary sample selection, people
who report at least one month of employment, one month of non-employment, and
one month for which they report a work limitation are selected. These preliminary
selection steps result in a sample of 12,905 people; 1,922 of them apply for DI
during the survey.
For these people, spells of non-employment are created, which can either end
in re-employment, application for DI, or be right-censored. Afterward, spells
where applicants work during the month they file an application are excluded.
This selection step would reduce the number of people in the sample by the same
amount as the number of applicants in the sample if only one spell per person was
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observed. However, some applicants who work while submitting an application
have prior spells of non-employment. These people remain in the sample, albeit
not their application episode. Therefore, the number of observed applications
decreases more than the number of people in the sample.
Next, spells for which no application begin is observed are disregarded. These
are either beneficiaries or people who are already in the process of applying at the
beginning of the spell. Since beneficiaries do not count as applicants, this step
decreases the overall number of people in the sample by more than the number of
applicants. The next step disregards spells with left-censored employment infor-
mation. Since most spells with left-censored employment information also have
left-censored application begin information, most of these spells are eliminated at
the previous selection step.
Individuals are further required to have sufficient prior employment and earn-
ings to pass the employment and earnings requirements for disability insurance
and unemployment insurance, respectively. Specifically, individuals need to have
positive earnings in the Detailed Earnings Records for at least 5 of the last 10
years to be eligible for DI. Moreover, their earnings in the last year before job loss
needs to be sufficiently high such that they are eligible for UI benefits based in
monetary eligibility stipulations.
The final selection step disregards spells during which people turn 62, are on
short-term layoff, or receive a pension. Spells are considered as layoffs if the person
reports being on layoff for at least one week. In this last selection step, disrupted
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Figure 2.3: Hazard Rate of applying for disability insurance. Striped lines indi-
cate 95 percent confidence intervals.
Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on dis-
ability insurance applications and awards.
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Figure 2.4: Fraction of unemployed workers who receive UI benefits by month of
unemployment.
Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on dis-
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of Elasticities for a 1 percentage increase in the Principal
Insurance Amount (PIA, positive elasticities) and UI Monthly Benefit Amounts
(MB, negative elasticities) on the hazard rate to DI application.
Source: Parameter estimates from Models (1) and (2) from table 2.8.
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Table 2.1: State Benefit Amount Formulas for January 1996 (selected states)
Replacement
State Min Max Rate (percent)
Alabama 22 180 54.17
Arkansas 47 264 50.00
D.C 50 359 50.00
Florida 10 250 50.00
Illinois 51 251 49.50
Kansas 65 260 55.25
Louisiana 10 181 52.00
Maine 14 347 59.09
Mississippi 30 180 50.00
New Jersey 60 362 60.00
New York 40 300 50.00
Oregon 70 301 70.00
South Carolina 20 213 50.00
Tennessee 30 200 50.00
Virginia 65 206 52.00
Washington 75 350 52.00
Wisconsin 52 274 52.00
Notes. – Source: Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Law, January 1996. Dollar
values are expressed in January 1996 values. Replacement rates are expressed as percentage of
weekly wages.
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Table 2.2: SIPP Modules and Health Indicators
Panel and Wave Work Lim. Dis. type Health Func. Lim. ADL Hospital
SIPP 1990, Wave 2 X X
SIPP 1990, Wave 3 X X X X X
SIPP 1990, Wave 4
SIPP 1990, Wave 6 X X X X
SIPP 1990, Wave 7 X
SIPP 1991, Wave 2 X X
SIPP 1991, Wave 3 X X X X X
SIPP 1991, Wave 4 X
SIPP 1991, Wave 7
SIPP 1992, Wave 2 X X
SIPP 1992, Wave 4
SIPP 1992, Wave 6 X X X X
SIPP 1992, Wave 7 X
SIPP 1992, Wave 9 X X X X X
SIPP 1993, Wave 2 X X
SIPP 1993, Wave 3 X X X X X
SIPP 1993, Wave 4 X
SIPP 1993, Wave 6 X X X X X
SIPP 1993, Wave 7
SIPP 1996, Wave 2 X
SIPP 1996, Wave 3 X X X
SIPP 1996, Wave 5 X X X
SIPP 1996, Wave 6 X X X
SIPP 1996, Wave 9 X X X
SIPP 1996, Wave 11 X X X
SIPP 1996, Wave 12 X X X
SIPP 2001, Wave 2 X
SIPP 2001, Wave 3 X X X
SIPP 2001, Wave 5 X X X
SIPP 2001, Wave 6 X X X
SIPP 2001, Wave 8 X X X
Notes. – Source: SIPP topical modules 1990-2001. An X indicates that the module contains
information about the respective topic. For instance, SIPP 1990, Topical Module 3 contains
information about general health, functional limitation, ADL, and hospital stays. The work
limitation question is asked in all core questionnaires of wave 1. For variable explanation and




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4: Quit, UI take-up and application for DI
UI take-up
Quit No Yes
No Cell percentage 55.38 21.68
Row percentage 71.80 28.11
Yes Cell percentage 18.43 4.38
Row percentage 80.61 19.16
DI application
Quit No Yes
No Cell percentage 69.18 7.88
Row percentage 89.70 10.22
Yes Cell percentage 21.50 1.32
Row percentage 94.02 5.75
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability
insurance applications and awards. See appendix 2.8 for details. All results are expressed as
percentages of transitions.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics
First Third
Mean Std. Quartile Median Quartile
Age 40.152 10.571 32.000 40.000 48.000
White 0.839 — — — —
Sex 0.479 — — — —
Household size 3.238 1.576 2.000 3.000 4.000
Children under 18 0.480 — — — —
Married 0.557 — — — —
Spouse works — Married 0.380 — — — —
High School Degree 0.807 — — — —
College 0.310 — — — —
Spell Duration 7.277 6.642 3.000 5.000 9.000
Number of transitions 1.438 0.766 1.000 1.000 2.000
Previous transition 0.300 — — — —
Outcome: Application 0.091 — — — —
Outcome: Employment 0.670 — — — —
Right Censored 0.237 — — — —
Work Limitation 0.816 — — — —
Will be work limited 0.092 — — — —
Limitation on list of impairments 0.117 — — — —
Health: excellent 0.130 — — — —
Health: very good 0.218 — — — —
Health: good 0.358 — — — —
Health: fair 0.210 — — — —
Health: poor 0.083 — — — —
ADL: 0 problems 0.542 — — — —
ADL: 1 problem 0.044 — — — —
ADL: 2 problems 0.397 — — — —
ADL: 3 problems 0.011 — — — —
ADL: 4+ problems 0.005 — — — —
FL: 0 problems 0.643 — — — —
FL: 1 problem 0.170 — — — —
FL: 2 problems 0.093 — — — —
FL: 3 problems 0.072 — — — —
FL: 4+ problems 0.022 — — — —
Person had been to hospital 0.186 — — — —
Person has health insurance 0.615 — — — —
Monthly earnings before job loss 1.299 1.414 0.599 0.994 1.624
Continued on next page
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Table 2.5 (continued from previous page)
First Third
Mean Std. Quartile Median Quartile
Monthly earnings of spouse 0.771 1.546 0.000 0.000 1.183
Monthly earnings of spouse — work 1.892 1.978 0.748 1.568 2.569
Principal Insurance Amount 0.676 0.310 0.435 0.616 0.900
UI take-up 0.263 — — — —
Monthly UI Benefit Amount (MB) 0.596 0.266 0.375 0.598 0.800
MB — UI take-up 0.650 0.259 0.453 0.654 0.833
Person received Worker’s Comp. 0.089 — — — —
Spell with extended benefits 0.299 — — — —
Unemployment rate 0.058 0.016 0.047 0.057 0.069
UI maximum benefit duration 5.974 — — — —
Waiting week for UI benefits 0.859 — — — —
Telephone interviews 0.211 — — — —
Disability provision 0.103 — — — —
Able and available: any work 0.652 — — — —
Able and available: suitable work 0.169 — — — —
Able and available: usual work 0.179 — — — —
Able and available: seeking work 0.711 — — — —
Waiting Time — Application 6.702 9.982 1.900 3.233 5.867
Successful application — appl. 0.527 — — — —
DI initial application success rate
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability
insurance applications and awards. Construction of spells is explained in appendix 2.8. All dollar
values are deflated to January 1990 values.
Variables which are reported once per person: age (as of first month of first non-employment
spell), white, male, married (as of first month of first non-employment spell), high-school grad-
uate (including some college), college degree, number of transitions, waiting time for DI, appli-
cation success for DI, Worker’s Compensation receipt.
Variables which are reported once per spell: UI take up, exit: applied, exit: employed,
exit:censored, UI Monthly Benefit Amount (as of first month of spell), extended benefits dur-
ing spell, waiting week, average highest monthly earnings last or this year, previous transition,
limitation on list of impairments.
Variables which are reported once per year: Principal Insurance Amount.
Variables which are reported once per month: spouse works, monthly earnings of spouse (con-
ditional on spouse working), unemployment rate, maximum benefit duration, waiting week for
UI benefits, telephone interviews, disability provisions, able and available provisions, DI initial
application success rate, spell duration.
Variables which are reported once per month, but observed once per topical module: health,
work limitation (SIPP 1990-1993; defined as whether person ever indicated a work limitation),
Activities of Daily Living, Functional Limitations, person had been to hospital, person has
health insurance. Topical variables are imputed to reflect the last observed answer.
Variables which are reported once per wave: number of people in the household, household has
children under 18, work limitation (SIPP 1996-2001; defined as whether person ever indicated
a work limitation).
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Table 2.6: Cumulative distribution of first DI benefit payment
Duration
Cumulative Percentage
of first DI payment








Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability
insurance applications and awards. See appendix 2.8 for details. The table reports the first three
months of non-employment together to avoid risk of disclosure.
Table 2.7: UI take-up and application for DI
DI application
UI take-up No Yes
No Cell percentage 66.21 7.61
Row percentage 89.55 10.29
Yes Cell percentage 24.47 1.59
Row percentage 93.89 6.11
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability
insurance applications and awards. See appendix 2.8 for details. All percentages are expressed
relative to number of transitions.
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Table 2.8: Hazard Model Estimates: Constant effect of MB
(1) (2)
Part Regressors Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
DI application Work Limitation 0.335 (0.135) 0.307 (0.153)
DI application Past Monthly Earnings −0.050 (0.115) −0.051 (0.118)
DI application Monthly Earnings (spouse) −0.080 (0.040) −0.097 (0.074)
DI application Spell has Extended Benefits −1.129 (0.117) −1.107 (0.195)
DI application Maximum UI benefit duration−0.102 (0.043) −0.111 (0.058)
DI application Unemployment Rate 0.776 (2.868) −0.677 (5.119)
DI application Principal Insurance Amount 0.913 (0.261) 0.945 (0.395)
DI application MB −0.018 (0.254) 0.101 (0.409)
DI application MB x UI take-up −1.148 (0.515) −1.347 (0.785)
DI application UI take-up 0.019 (0.312) −0.693 (0.612)
UI take-up Work Limitation −0.180 (0.058) −0.183 (0.147)
UI take-up Past Monthly Earnings −0.058 (0.028) −0.056 (0.030)
UI take-up Monthly Earnings (spouse) −0.095 (0.030) −0.113 (0.070)
UI take-up Spell has Extended Benefits 0.217 (0.055) 0.280 (0.122)
UI take-up Maximum UI benefit duration−0.098 (0.023) −0.110 (0.064)
UI take-up Unemployment Rate 5.523 (3.039) 6.488 (5.288)
UI take-up MB 0.862 (0.157) 0.933 (0.253)
UI take-up DI application −1.206 (0.328) −1.781 (0.507)
UI take-up Waiting Week −0.035 (0.134) −0.050 (0.208)
UI take-up Telephone Interview 0.052 (0.110) 0.044 (0.213)
UI take-up Disability Provision 0.168 (0.113) 0.203 (0.280)
UI take-up Suitable Work 0.079 (0.142) 0.092 (0.252)
UI take-up Usual Work 0.068 (0.188) 0.032 (0.311)
UI take-up Actively Seeking −0.118 (0.138) −0.118 (0.223)
DI application ζD1 2.065 (1.066)
DI application ζD2 0.746 (0.165)
DI application ζD3 0.148 (0.015)
UI take-up ζU1 2.496 (3.843)
UI take-up ζU2 0.847 (0.481)
UI take-up ζU3 0.334 (0.072)
Log LH -6923.97 -6873.71
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability insurance
applications and awards. The part “DI application” refers to the hazard of applying for DI, while the part
“UI take-up” refers to the take-up decision of UI benefits. All models are estimated for the first 24 months of
duration. Block bootstrapped standard errors with 100 repetitions and states as blocks are shown. All dollar
values are deflated to January 1990 values and expressed in thousand of dollars. Past earnings are highest yearly
earnings for the year of and the year before job loss. Information on yearly earnings are obtained from the
Detailed Earnings Records (DER).
Variables besides those shown in the table: age, age squared; male; high-school graduate; white; married; spouse
works; spell is second of more spell of person; household size; number of children under 18; health (good, medium,
fair and poor; reference: excellent); Activities of Daily living (problems with one, two, three, or four or more;
reference: no problems); Functional Limitations (one, two, three, four or more; reference: no limitations); whether
person was in a hospital during last year; whether person has health insurance; U.S. divisions; calender years.
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Table 2.9: Hazard Model Estimates: Duration-specific effects
(1) (2)
Part Regressors Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
DI application Work Limitation 0.328 (0.111) 0.298 (0.155)
DI application Past Monthly Earnings −0.047 (0.128) −0.051 (0.084)
DI application Monthly Earnings (spouse) −0.077 (0.040) −0.092 (0.050)
DI application Spell has Extended Benefits −1.126 (0.133) −1.102 (0.200)
DI application Maximum UI benefit duration −0.099 (0.038) −0.114 (0.050)
DI application Unemployment Rate 0.920 (3.512) −0.321 (5.384)
DI application Principal Insurance Amount 0.912 (0.257) 0.942 (0.311)
DI application MB −0.132 (0.283) −0.076 (0.374)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 1 −0.497 (0.578) −0.386 (0.635)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 2 −0.168 (0.334) −0.085 (0.332)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 3 −0.784 (0.530) −0.720 (0.499)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 4 −0.563 (0.460) −0.540 (0.405)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 5 −2.070 (2.666) −2.113 (5.383)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 6 −0.549 (0.888) −0.631 (0.680)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 7 −1.182 (1.582) −1.340 (2.358)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 8 −1.155 (6.186) −1.410 (5.674)
DI application MB x UI take-up x Duration 9+−0.527 (0.495) −0.760 (0.708)
DI application UI take-up −0.462 (0.133) −1.290 (0.550)
Continued on next page
93
Table 2.9 (continued from previous page)
(1) (2)
Part Regressors Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
UI take-up Work Limitation −0.180 (0.050) −0.184 (0.109)
UI take-up Past Monthly Earnings −0.058 (0.026) −0.057 (0.031)
UI take-up Monthly Earnings (spouse) −0.095 (0.030) −0.114 (0.050)
UI take-up Spell has Extended Benefits 0.217 (0.051) 0.279 (0.150)
UI take-up Maximum UI benefit duration−0.098 (0.022) −0.103 (0.057)
UI take-up Unemployment Rate 5.522 (2.878) 6.709 (4.798)
UI take-up MB 0.863 (0.146) 0.929 (0.325)
UI take-up DI application −1.206 (0.364) −1.788 (0.634)
UI take-up Waiting Week −0.035 (0.140) −0.053 (0.208)
UI take-up Telephone Interview 0.052 (0.118) 0.045 (0.222)
UI take-up Disability Provision 0.168 (0.137) 0.200 (0.327)
UI take-up Suitable Work 0.079 (0.127) 0.092 (0.231)
UI take-up Usual Work 0.068 (0.191) 0.023 (0.238)
UI take-up Actively Seeking −0.118 (0.146) −0.116 (0.273)
DI application ζD1 0.935 (0.375)
DI application ζD2 0.196 (0.031)
DI application ζD3 2.578 (1.203)
UI take-up ζU1 0.511 (0.283)
UI take-up ζU2 0.223 (0.047)
UI take-up ζU3 1.592 (3.008)
Log LH -6923.29 -6871.83
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability
insurance applications and awards.The part “DI application” refers to the hazard of applying
for DI, while the part “UI take-up” refers to the take-up decision of UI benefits. All models
are estimated for the first 24 months of duration. Block bootstrapped standard errors with 100
repetitions and states as blocks are shown. All dollar values are deflated to January 1990 values
and expressed in thousand of dollars. Past earnings are highest yearly earnings for the year of
and the year before job loss. Information on yearly earnings are obtained from the Detailed
Earnings Records (DER). Compensation.
Variables besides those shown in the table: age, age squared; male; high-school graduate; white;
married; spouse works; spell is second of more spell of person; household size; number of children
under 18; health (good, medium, fair and poor; reference: excellent); Activities of Daily living
(problems with one, two, three, or four or more; reference: no problems); Functional Limitations
(one, two, three, four or more; reference: no limitations); whether person was in a hospital during
last year; whether person has health insurance; U.S. divisions; calender years.
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Table 2.10: Hazard Model Estimates: State’s Initial Application Success Rates
(1) (2)
Part Regressors Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
DI application Work Limitation 0.334 (0.137) 0.315 (0.147)
DI application Past Monthly Earnings -0.049 (0.128) -0.054 (0.122)
DI application Monthly Earnings (spouse) -0.079 (0.035) -0.093 (0.064)
DI application DI Initial Appl. Success Rate -1.240 (0.965) -1.374 (1.455)
DI application Spell has Extended Benefits -1.132 (0.134) -1.105 (0.202)
DI application Maximum UI benefit duration -0.082 (0.041) -0.095 (0.072)
DI application Unemployment Rate -0.500 (3.218) -1.542 (5.838)
DI application Principal Insurance Amount 0.907 (0.266) 0.941 (0.424)
DI application MB -0.003 (0.281) 0.129 (0.412)
DI application MB x UI take-up -1.152 (0.510) -1.347 (0.838)
DI application UI take-up 0.026 (0.315) -0.659 (0.622)
UI take-up Work Limitation -0.180 (0.063) -0.182 (0.139)
UI take-up Past Monthly Earnings -0.059 (0.027) -0.057 (0.044)
UI take-up Monthly Earnings (spouse) -0.095 (0.030) -0.114 (0.082)
UI take-up DI Initial Appl. Success Rate -0.475 (0.845) -0.233 (1.385)
UI take-up Extended Benefits 0.218 (0.055) 0.277 (0.157)
UI take-up Maximum UI benefit duration -0.090 (0.026) -0.101 (0.067)
UI take-up Unemployment Rate 5.061 (3.050) 6.579 (5.612)
UI take-up MB 0.869 (0.154) 0.941 (0.358)
UI take-up DI application -1.204 (0.369) -1.788 (0.597)
UI take-up Waiting Time -0.037 (0.137) -0.055 (0.204)
UI take-up Telephone Interview 0.056 (0.110) 0.045 (0.219)
UI take-up Disability Provision 0.172 (0.125) 0.201 (0.278)
UI take-up Suitable Work 0.070 (0.143) 0.090 (0.289)
UI take-up Usual Work 0.059 (0.200) 0.022 (0.312)
UI take-up Actively Seeking -0.118 (0.113) -0.118 (0.284)
DI application ζD1 0.937 (0.264)
DI application ζD2 0.260 (0.008)
DI application ζD3 2.825 (1.639)
UI take-up ζU1 0.519 (0.399)
UI take-up ζU2 0.239 (0.022)
UI take-up ζU3 1.679 (3.532)
Log LH -6923.25 -6872.72
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability insurance
applications and awards.The part “DI application” refers to the hazard of applying for DI, while the part “UI
take-up” refers to the take-up decision of UI benefits. All models are estimated for the first 24 months of duration.
Block bootstrapped standard errors with 100 repetitions and states as blocks are shown. All dollar values are
deflated to January 1990 values and expressed in thousand of dollars. Past earnings are highest yearly earnings
for the year of and the year before job loss. Information on yearly earnings are obtained from the Detailed
Earnings Records (DER). Compensation.
Variables besides those shown in the table: age, age squared; male; high-school graduate; white; married; spouse
works; spell is second of more spell of person; household size; number of children under 18; health (good, medium,
fair and poor; reference: excellent); Activities of Daily living (problems with one, two, three, or four or more;
reference: no problems); Functional Limitations (one, two, three, four or more; reference: no limitations); whether























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.13: Hazard Model Estimates: SUR
Part Regressors Coeff. SE
DI application Work Limitation 0.415 (0.228)
DI application Past Monthly Earnings -0.044 (0.173)
DI application Monthly Earnings (spouse) -0.073 (0.079)
DI application Spell has Extended Benefits -1.245 (0.224)
DI application Maximum UI benefit duration -0.124 (0.051)
DI application Unemployment Rate -1.478 (5.236)
DI application Principal Insurance Amount 1.024 (0.526)
DI application Monthly UI benefit amount (MB) -0.368 (0.401)
UI take-up Work Limitation -0.200 (0.116)
UI take-up Past Monthly Earnings -0.071 (0.051)
UI take-up Monthly Earnings (spouse) -0.108 (0.068)
UI take-up Spell has Extended Benefits 0.267 (0.151)
UI take-up Maximum UI benefit duration -0.070 (0.025)
UI take-up Unemployment Rate 7.323 (5.131)
UI take-up Monthly UI benefit amount (MB) 0.998 (0.268)
DI application ζD1 0.327 (0.067)
DI application ζD2 0.363 (0.050)
DI application ζD3 2.606 (0.997)
DI application ζD4 0.428 (0.084)
UI take-up ζU1 2.343 (0.894)
UI take-up ζU2 0.503 (0.028)
UI take-up ζU3 0.286 (0.132)
UI take-up ζU4 0.886 (0.333)
Log LH -6915.64
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability insurance
applications and awards. The part “DI application” refers to the hazard of applying for DI, while the part
“UI take-up” refers to the take-up decision of UI benefits. All models are estimated for the first 24 months of
duration. Block bootstrapped standard errors with 100 repetitions and states as blocks are shown. All dollar
values are deflated to January 1990 values and expressed in thousand of dollars. Past earnings are highest yearly
earnings for the year of and the year before job loss. Information on yearly earnings are obtained from the
Detailed Earnings Records (DER). Compensation.
Variables besides those shown in the table: age, age squared; male; high-school graduate; white; married; spouse
works; spell is second of more spell of person; household size; number of children under 18; health (good, medium,
fair and poor; reference: excellent); Activities of Daily living (problems with one, two, three, or four or more;
reference: no problems); Functional Limitations (one, two, three, four or more; reference: no limitations); whether
person was in a hospital during last year; whether person has health insurance; U.S. divisions; calender years.
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Table 2.14: Hazard Model Estimates: Maximum UI Benefit Duration
(1) (2)
Part Regressors Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
DI application Work Limitation 0.308 (0.098) 0.299 (0.199)
DI application Past Monthly Earnings -0.047 (0.122) -0.050 (0.158)
DI application Monthly Earnings (spouse) -0.082 (0.032) -0.093 (0.061)
DI application Spell has Extended Benefits -1.106 (0.115) -1.084 (0.239)
DI application Max. UI benefit duration -0.186 (0.071) -0.191 (0.127)
DI application Unemployment Rate -1.172 (3.124) -2.275 (5.474)
DI application Principal Insurance Amount 0.976 (0.265) 1.016 (0.566)
DI application MB -0.064 (0.285) 0.061 (0.342)
DI application MB x UI take-up -1.147 (0.480) -1.345 (0.712)
DI application UI take-up 0.013 (0.295) -0.630 (0.958)
UI take-up Work Limitation -0.192 (0.058) -0.192 (0.122)
UI take-up Past Monthly Earnings -0.044 (0.023) -0.043 (0.046)
UI take-up Monthly Earnings (spouse) -0.095 (0.027) -0.111 (0.088)
UI take-up Spell has Extended Benefits 0.217 (0.057) 0.278 (0.153)
UI take-up Max. UI benefit duration -0.100 (0.095) -0.093 (0.154)
UI take-up Unemployment Rate 3.711 (3.132) 4.901 (4.686)
UI take-up MB 0.834 (0.142) 0.900 (0.272)
UI take-up DI application -1.221 (0.372) -1.753 (1.022)
UI take-up Waiting Week -0.118 (0.143) -0.133 (0.275)
UI take-up Telephone Interview 0.048 (0.112) 0.032 (0.197)
UI take-up Disability Provision 0.080 (0.126) 0.106 (0.289)
UI take-up Suitable Work 0.062 (0.147) 0.082 (0.254)
UI take-up Usual Work -0.049 (0.145) -0.087 (0.394)

























Log LH -6916.98 -6860.17
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability insurance
applications and awards. The part “DI application” refers to the hazard of applying for DI, while the part
“UI take-up” refers to the take-up decision of UI benefits. All models are estimated for the first 24 months of
duration. Block bootstrapped standard errors with 100 repetitions and states as blocks are shown. All dollar
values are deflated to January 1990 values and expressed in thousand of dollars. Past earnings are highest yearly
earnings for the year of and the year before job loss. Information on yearly earnings are obtained from the
Detailed Earnings Records (DER)..
Variables besides those shown in the table: age, age squared; male; high-school graduate; white; married; spouse
works; spell is second of more spell of person; household size; number of children under 18; health (good, medium,
fair and poor; reference: excellent); Activities of Daily living (problems with one, two, three, or four or more;
reference: no problems); Functional Limitations (one, two, three, four or more; reference: no limitations); whether
person was in a hospital during last year; whether person has health insurance; U.S. divisions; calender years.
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Table 2.15: Elasticities for hazard to DI application
Regressors Elasticities
Principal Insurance Amount 0.672
UI maximum duration -0.927
MB x UI take-up -0.094
Monthly Earnings (spouse) -0.052
Notes. – Source: SIPP panels 1990-2001 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability




Reconciling Findings on the Employment Effect
of Disability Insurance
3.1 Introduction
While employment rates for working-aged men in the 1990s and 2000s re-
mained constant, employment rates for the men with work limitations fell through-
out this time (Burkhauser et al., 2002a).1 For instance, between 1990 and 2003,
the employment rate of people with a work limitation in the March CPS declined
from 34% to just above 20% (see figure 3.1).2 During the same period, the frac-
tion of the working-aged population receiving Social Security Disability Insurance
(DI) benefits increased substantially (see figure 3.2).3 Increased generosity as well
as congressional reforms which made disability insurance accessible to a larger
pool of people with health impairments are thought to be the major reason for
this increase in DI enrollment.4 In this paper, we address the question to which
1Correspondingly, while employment rates for women increased during the same time, em-
ployment rates for women with a work limitation remained constant.
2Figure 3.1 shows the employment rate during the weeks before the surveys were conducted.
Therefore, the employment rates are somewhat lower as compared to Burkhauser et al. (2002a),
who report the fraction of people employed at all during the last year.
3A similar increase has occurred for the Supplemental Security Income for the blind and
disabled (SSI). Since SSI draws from a population with lower labor force attachment than those
applying for DI, we restrict our attention to the role of the DI.
4Other reasons include an increase in the after-tax replacement rate (i.e. the ratio of past
wage earnings to disability benefits), and, for women, their increase in labor force participation
which resulted in a larger fraction of insured workers (Autor and Duggan, 2006).
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extend the growth in DI has resulted in the declining employment rate of men
with work limitations.
We develop a framework which decomposes changes in the overall employment
rate of men with work limitations into changes due to the growth of the disabil-
ity insurance system, and employment changes of work limited men who do not
receive DI. We further distinguish between men who had applied for disability
benefits but were denied benefits, and men who had never filed an application
(non-applicants). This decomposition allows us to distinguish between employ-
ment decline due to higher DI participation and employment decline due to other
factors. We concentrate in this analysis on men, since their employment decline
has been a major focus of the current discussion, and because the secular in-
crease in female labor force participation makes it more difficult to interpret this
decomposition for women.
For the early 1990s, our results show that the increased availability of the
DI program can only fully explain the employment decline of men under the
assumption that beneficiaries would work like non-applicants if they were not in
the program. A, possibly, more realistic assumption about their counterfactual
employment rate — that they would work like denied applicants if they were not
in the program — leaves half of the employment decline unexplained. The notion
that other factors importantly contributed to the employment decline is further
supported by the decomposition results for the mid-1990s and to early 2000s.
During that time period, increased availability of the DI program can explain
less than 50 percent of the overall employment decline. Consistently, employment
rates for those not on DI have been declining throughout this period. Furthermore,
when comparing employment and DI enrollment trends across age groups, we find
that employment declined the most for men under 44 years, while the fraction of
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DI beneficiaries increased the most for men 55 years or older.
We contribute to the literature by developing a framework which helps ac-
counting for why different studies have found disparate findings regarding the em-
ployment effect of DI. Several aggregate studies have suggested that the growth
in the DI program during the 1990s may account for much, if not all of the em-
ployment decline of men with work limitations. Bound and Waidmann (2002)
regress changes of DI participation rates on the fraction of workers with health
impairment who are not employed. Autor and Duggan (2003) provide similar
cross-state regressions for the period 1979 to 1998 for high-school drop-outs, who
are similarly at risk of applying for DI as workers with work limitations. In both
studies, the increase in the fraction of DI participants appears to have a major
negative effect on employment of men with work limitations. In contrast to these
analyzes, studies that have used rejected disability insurance applicants to mea-
sure the labor market potential of beneficiaries have found that rejected applicants
have low earnings and employment rates. Bound (1989) analyzes two samples of
denied applicants from the 1970s. Arguing that they are similar to beneficiaries
in observed and unobserved characteristics, he considers their employment rate
as an estimate of how much beneficiaries would work if they had not applied for
DI. He finds a low employment rate for denied male applicants of no more than
50 per cent. These results have been replicated for the same age category of men
45 years and older by von Wachter et al. (2010), who use administrative records
spanning the time period 1978 to 2004. Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) find
similar results using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) covering the 1990s. They exploit a discontinuity in the determination
process to estimate the disincentive effect for a subgroup of applicants those de-
termination is based on vocational factors.5 They estimate that the employment
5Initial Application for disability insurance follows a five-stage procedure. Vocational fac-
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rate of these DI beneficiaries would have been only 20 percent higher had they not
received benefits. These results have generally been interpreted as evidence that
the increased availability of the DI system could have had at most a moderate
effect on the employment rates of people with work limitations.
Each approach involves making assumptions that are open to some question.
On the one side, Bound and Waidmann (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003)
observe only ecological correlations. It is possible, though, that men with work
limitations found it increasingly difficult to work during the time period, while
the DI program drew from a population with relatively low employment rates. If
this were the case, the approach used by Bound and Waidmann and Autor and
Duggan would overstate the effect of the increase in the availability of DI benefits
on the employment of men. On the other side, Bound (1989), Chen and van der
Klaauw (2008) and von Wachter et al. (2010) provide accurate estimates of the
counterfactual employment rate of beneficiaries only if the application process it-
self does not substantially reduce employment for denied applicants. Furthermore,
Bound’s and Chen and van der Klaauw’s results pertain to men 45 years or older.6
While applicants younger than 45 years were very rare before the mid-1980s, the
majority of the DI growth during the early 1990s has occurred among younger
men (Autor and Duggan, 2003). For this group of men, employment rates of
rejected applicants are much higher, suggesting a substantial disincentive effect
(von Wachter et al., 2010).
We overcome limitations of these two approaches by identifying non-applicants
through administrative records, and by assessing the expansion of the DI system
jointly with employment rates for different application and age groups. Our results
tors are considered at the fifth stage for those applicants who have not qualified for disability
insurance based on severe impairments. See Hu et al. (2001) for a description of the application
process.
6Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) exploit discontinuities for ages 45, 50, and 55. Therefore,
by construction, they estimate the average treatment effect for these age groups only.
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clarify that the employment decline during the early 1990s can only be explained
by the concurrent DI expansion if the marginal beneficiaries would work at rates
comparable to non-applicants, were they not in the program. This seems doubtful.
In addition, we extend our analysis past the period of rapid expansion of the DI
program. Employment rates for men with work limitations continued to decline
in the late 199s and early 2000, despite a slow down in the rate of growth of DI.
This fact, alone, would seem to suggest important other factors at work.
Section 3.2 briefly discusses main features of the DI program as well as major
policy changes over the last decades. In section 3.3, we develop and discuss the
decomposition. Section 3.4 provides a description of the main data sources used
for this study. It is followed by results (section 3.5) and concluding remarks
(section 3.6).
3.2 Background
The federal government provides cash and medical benefits to the disabled
through two programs, the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program,
which was enacted in 1956, and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program,
enacted in 1974. For both programs, successful application requires the
(...) inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted, or can be expected
to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.7
During the 1960s and 1970s, the DI program was made accessible to a wider
range of people. In 1960, individuals under the age of 50 were made eligible
7See See Title II of the Social Security Act, Section 223. [42U.S.C. 423], (d)(1)(A)
(http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP Home/ssact/title02/0223.htm.)
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for DI, and in 1965, the definition of disability was liberalized to allow those
without permanent disabilities to qualify. In 1972, the waiting period required
before an applicant for DI could start receiving benefits was reduced from six to
five months and benefit levels were being increased. By the mid-1970s typical
after-tax replacement rates reached 60 percent. In addition, the introduction of
the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) effectively eliminated the work
history requirement for those without either significant assets or other sources of
income.
With the increase in both the availability and generosity of the program, it is
no surprise that DI rolls grew rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, and reached 2.9
million (3 percent of the working-age population) by 1980. Total benefits paid out
exceeded $15 billion, or 20 percent of benefits paid out for retirement. Concern
grew during the 1970s that the Social Security Administration was losing control
over the system and that many DI beneficiaries might not actually be eligible un-
der the law. The Social Security Administration first responded to this situation
both by trying to refine their regulations guiding decisions, and by negotiating
agreements with various states. The consequences were quite dramatic. Award
rates fell from 48.8 to 33.3 percent between 1975 and 1980, with this fall concen-
trated among states that had been more lenient in their decision making. Then in
1980 Congress passed legislation designed to tighten administrative control over
the disability determination process in a number of ways. The 1980 law changed
both the frequency and the nature of medical eligibility reviews for disability ben-
eficiaries, and it had a discernible impact on administrative practice. The number
of new awards continued to drop from 40 to 29 percent of all insured workers
between 1980 and 1982. At the same time, there was a five-fold increase in the
number of terminations. In two years’ time, 25 percent of beneficiaries had their
cases reviewed and more than 40 percent of those reviewed had their benefits ter-
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minated. These stricter practices led to questions about due process. Many who
had their benefits terminated during this period won reinstatement on appeal,
and concern grew that many of those who did not appeal their terminations were,
in fact, eligible for benefits.
Widespread criticism led Congress to further change the law in 1984. These
amendments had a profound effect on the standards used to evaluate DI eligibil-
ity. First, the burden of proof was shifted onto the Social Security Administration
to demonstrate that the health of beneficiaries under review had improved suffi-
ciently to allow them to return to work. Second, a moratorium was imposed on
reevaluations of the most troublesome cases — those that involved mental impair-
ments or pain — until more appropriate guidelines could be developed. Third,
benefits were continued for those whose terminations were under appeal. Fourth,
more weight was given to source evidence (evidence provided by the claimant’s
own physician) by requiring that it be considered first, prior to the results of an
SSA consultative examination. Fifth, consideration had to be given to the com-
bined effect of all of an individual’s impairments, regardless of whether any single
impairment was severe enough to qualify the individual for benefits. Finally, and
perhaps most important, the Social Security Administration substantially revised
its treatment of mental illness, reducing the weight given to diagnostic or medical
factors and emphasizing the ability of an individual to function in work or work-
like settings. Further liberalization in eligibility criteria were implemented in 1988
and then again in 1991 when the Social Security Administration issued new rulings
on pain that gave controlling weight to source evidence when such opinions were
supported by medical evidence and were not inconsistent with other evidence in
the case record. In addition, court opinions throughout the 1980s and early 1990s
tended to reinforce SSA shift in favor of source opinions (Social Security Advisory
Board 2001).
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The application for DI benefits seem to mirror changes in eligibility standards,
rising when standards were relaxed during the 1960s and early 1970s, and falling
when standards were tightened in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Application rates
appear to have responded more slowly to the relaxation of eligibility standards
that occurred in 1984. This may have been because, given the nature of the
reforms, it was some years before they were effectively implemented and before
potential applicants understood how fundamentally the evaluation criteria had
changed. Also, the strength of the economy during the later part of the 1980s
would have discouraged applicants, while the deep recession of the early 1990s
would have induced many to apply for benefits.
Since the reform in the mid-1980s, not only did the number of beneficiaries
increase, but also their composition. Specifically, the share of younger workers
below 45 years old has experienced the strongest relative increase between 1980
and the mid-1990s. The increased availability of the DI program and the shift
towards younger beneficiaries naturally suggests that this shift in disability policy
has importantly contributed much to the employment decline of people with health
impairments since 1990.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
We decompose the overall change in employment rates for those experiencing a
work limitation into changes within and between application categories. Consider
the following decomposition of the employment rate of men with some health
impairment at a time t = 1:
E1 = Wb,1 · Eb,1 + Wd,1 · Ed,1 + Wn,1 · En,1 ,
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where where the b, d and n subscripts index beneficiary, denied applicant and
non-applicants, respectively, and E’s represent first the overall employment rate of
those with work limitations, and then the employment rates of those on DI, those
who applied for DI benefits but were rejected and, finally, those who never applied
for benefits. In this decomposition we ignore men who are currently applying for
DI and former beneficiaries whose benefits were terminated. Both groups are
small and do not change the empirical results. The W ’s represent the fractions of
the population, among those identifying themselves with work limitations, in each
group. The employment rate for t = 2 can be decomposed in the same fashion:
E2 = Wb,2 · Eb,2 + Wd,2 · Ed,2 + Wn,2 · En,2 .
Taking the difference between the two time periods and denoting changes by
∆ yields:
∆E = ∆Wb ·Eb +∆Wd ·Ed +∆Wn ·En +W b ·∆Eb +W d ·∆Ed +W n ·∆En , (3.1)
where upper bars indicate averages taken over two periods. We can rewrite
equation (3.1) using the fact that ∆Wn = −(∆Wd + ∆Wb).
∆E = ∆Wb ·(Eb−En)+∆Wd ·(Ed−En)+W b ·∆Eb +W d∆Ed +W n∆En . (3.2)
Equation (3.2) is simply an accounting identify. However, if we assume that,
had those who applied to DI in period 2 who would not have done so in period
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1 would have had employment rates similar to the employment rates of non-
applicants, then the first two terms have an economic interpretation. The first
term ∆Wb · (Eb − En) in the decomposition measures the effect that the growth
in the fraction of men on DI contributes to the decline in the employment of
those with work limitations, while the second term measures the effect that the
growth in the fraction of men that are denied applicants have on the employment
decline. The last three terms represent the within group employment declines.
It is not clear how plausible it would be to attribute any of these components
to the increased availability of DI benefits. In particular, the last of these three
components reflects employment changes amongst those who never applied for
DI benefits. It seems safe to assume that this component does not reflect any
behavioral effect of the program.8
If the increased availability of the disability insurance program during the
1990s has mainly involved men who would previously have been working, then
equation (3.2) accurately measures the employment effect of the disability insur-
ance program during this time. It is seems more plausible, however, that this
form of decomposition overstates the role of the DI growth, since it assumes that
denied applicants and beneficiaries would have the same employment rate as non-
applicants if they had not applied. While one might argue that the marginal
applicant during the 1990s had a higher employment rate than the average ap-
plicant (i.e. that the expansion of the DI program drew from a population which
was increasingly employed beforehand), Chen and van der Klaauw’s study for the
1990s suggests that this is not the case. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of the
8With the expansion of DI, the size of the population of non-applicants will shrink. Pre-
sumably this should mean the remaining non-applicants are more capable of work. Thus, these
compositional shifts should work in the direction of making this last term positive. To the
extent that this term is negative, it would seem to clearly point to factors unrelated to the
increased availability of DI contributing to the decline in the employment of the men with work
limitations.
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early 1990s was preceded by a severe decline in the number of beneficiaries be-
tween the late 1970s to early 1980s. As shown in figure 3.2, the fraction of men on
DI topped 3.5 percent in the early to mid-1990s, but it was about 3.2 percent in
1977. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the employment rate of applicants during
the expansion in the early 1990s was that different from the employment rate of
applicants in the 1970s.
An alternative decomposition involves substituting out ∆W d instead of ∆W n
in equation (3.1). We obtain then
∆E = ∆Wb ·(Eb−Ed)+∆Wn ·(En−Ed)+W b ·∆Eb +W d∆Ed +W n∆En . (3.3)
In this case, the expansion of the DI program is weighted by the difference
Eb − Ed instead of Eb − En. The leading term of this decomposition reflects the
effect of the expansion of DI on employment if marginal beneficiaries would have
had employment rates similar to denied applicants, had they not been receiving
benefits, and if the application for DI itself does not reduce the employment of
denied applicants.
These two decompositions help us interpret previous studies on the employ-
ment effect of DI. The approach by Bound and Waidmann (2002) and Autor and
Duggan (2003) may be stated as estimating a type of the following specification:
∆E = β∆Wb + ε. (3.4)
If there is no correlation between the other terms of the decomposition and
the fraction of DI beneficiaries, then the OLS estimate β̂ correctly estimates the
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employment effect for the 1990s. However, if factors other than the increased
availability of the DI system contributed to the employment decline, then ε and Wb
in the regression of equation (3.4) will be negatively correlated, and the magnitude
of β̂ will be biased upwards. Autor and Duggan (2003) address this issue by using
instrumental variables. They exploit changes to DI generosity due to shifts in the
wage distribution. However, their IV estimates are imprecise, and the 95 percent
confidence interval for men after 1984 includes the possibility that the growth of
DI had no effect on employment decline.
In contrast, studies that base inference on the behavior of denied applications
such as Bound (1989), Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) and von Wachter et al.
(2010) estimate the average treatment effect of receiving disability insurance for
beneficiaries. If the average treatment effect is small, then the difference Eb−Ed in
equation (3.3) is small as well. In this case, it would be unlikely that the increased
availability of the DI program has had a strong effect on the employment rate of
men with work limitations. There are two reasons why this conclusion might be
wrong. First, the average treatment effect of applying for DI for denied applicants
might be non-negligible (Parsons, 1991). In this case, using the employment rate
of denied applicants would understate the average treatment effect of receiving
disability insurance for beneficiaries. Second, Bound’s and Chen and van der
Klaauw’s studies have estimated the disincentive effect for workers 45 years or
older, whereas most of the expansion of the DI program has occurred among
younger workers. For these denied applicants, von Wachter et al. (2010) finds a
much higher employment rate.
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3.4 Data and sample selection
Estimating the decompositions requires information about fractions of non-
applicants, denied applicants, and beneficiaries, as well as their respective em-
ployment rates. We use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),
a nationally representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and older of the
civilian non-institutionalized population. People are interviewed once every four
months, called a wave, for two to four years. When sampling a new SIPP panel,
the Census Bureau randomly groups people into four rotation groups. Starting
with the first rotation group, each subsequent rotation group is interviewed one
month after the previous one. When interviewed, respondents are asked to pro-
vide information about the preceding four months, which are also called reference
months.
While the SIPP asks respondents about their employment situation and work
limitations, it does not contain information regarding applications and application
outcomes for DI. Several administrative files were used in order to identify bene-
ficiaries, denied applicants, and non-applicants. Specifically, we use the so-called
831 files to identify applicants, and Master Beneficiary Records and Payment His-
tory Update System data to identify award decisions (see appendix A for details).
These administrative files were matched to SIPP records using respondent’s Social
Security Number (SSN). Since people who disclose their SSN systematically differ
from people who do not, we reweight the original population weights provided by
Census (see for instance Raghunathan, 2004) before selecting those respondents
who disclosed their SSN. The administrative records are not available for SIPP
panels 1986 to 1989. Therefore, our analysis is restricted to the SIPP panel 1984
and SIPP panels 1990s and later.
We restricted out sample to men between 25 and 61 years who report a work
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limitation. We eliminate men under the age of 25 because very few such individ-
uals apply for DI and over the age of 61 because such men would be eligible for
Social Security Retirement benefits. We limit our-self to men who identify them-
selves as suffering from some kind of work limitation because men who experience
no such limitations are very unlikely to either apply for DI benefits or have them
awarded.
For panels prior to the 1996 panel, work limitations are overreported for all
waves except the first one (Maag and Wittenburg, 2003). Therefore, we only use
the first wave for these panels. For the 1996 and 2001 panel, we disregard the
first wave due to implementation problems. We exclude men who have been in the
army, and men who have applied or are currently applying for SSI for the blind and
disabled only.9 With these restrictions, the fraction of men identified as having
a work limitation remains approximately constant through the years we examine
(see table 3.1). For an exact decomposition, we also disregard current applicants
and men who had received DI, but those benefits had been terminated. Both
groups are relatively small, and a more extensive decomposition which includes
these two groups does not change the results.10 Finally, we select the fourth
reference month for each wave,11 and use last weeks’ employment status, which
corresponds to the standard CPS employment measure. Details on administrative
records and the sample selection are contained in appendix A.
Four waves are used for the decomposition. These are SIPP panel 1990, wave
9People can apply for DI and SSI for the blind and disabled simultaneously if they fulfill the
respective eligibility criteria. These dual applicant or beneficiaries are not disregarded.
10For the sample prior to disregarding current applicants and men who had received disability
insurance, the fraction of current applicants is generally between 2.5 and 5.5 percent for the
waves considered, and does not show any trend. The fraction of men those benefits have been
terminated increases from about 1 percent to 3 percent between the 1990 and 2004 panel, which
is consistent with a decrease of terminations due to death and retirement, and an increase of
terminations due to medical disqualifications since the late 1980s (Autor and Duggan, 2006).
11This is the month preceding the interview month, and therefore likely to be the least affected
by recall bias regarding past employment status.
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1, SIPP panel 1996, wave 2, SIPP panel 2001, wave 5, and SIPP panel 2004, wave
1. The fourth reference month of the first wave of the SIPP 1990 covers January
through April 1990, just before the recession of 1990/1991 and the expansion of
the DI program started.12 For the 1996 SIPP panel, the fourth reference month of
the second wave covers July through October 1996, which corresponds to a time
where the major expansion of the early 1990s had subsided. The 2001 SIPP was
conducted around and after the recession of 2001, which occurred between March
and November 2001. Since DI participation growth tends to lag the unemployment
rate (Rupp and Stapleton, 1995), we choose wave 5 of the 2001 panel, which
corresponds to May through August of 2002. We also use the first wave of the
2004 SIPP, which covers January through April 2004, because the full effect of the
recession on employment and DI participation might only appear after the 2001
panel was conducted.13 Besides these four waves, we will use all of the selected
waves to discuss some of the findings of the decomposition.
3.5 Results
Table 3.2 presents population fractions of men by applicant status, i.e. non-
applicant, beneficiary, and denied applicant. At the beginning of 1990, a little bit
more than two thirds of men 25 to 61 years old with a reported work limitation
are non-applicants, 19 percent are beneficiaries, and 13.9 percent denied appli-
cants. Older men are more likely to receive DI benefits, whereas the fraction of
denied applicant is relatively stable across age groups. In 1996, the picture had
changed quite dramatically. The fraction of non-applicants had decreased by 10
12Following the NBER business cycle dates, the recession of 1990/1991 started in July 1990.
13Results from the 2004 SIPP should be treated with caution, since the percentage of men
with work limitation is noticeably higher as compared to previous panels. If the population
with a work limitation in the 2004 panel is more healthy as compared to the population with a
work limitation in previous panels, then both the overall employment change and the role of DI
growth would be understated. The overall bias for the decomposition is therefore unclear.
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percentage points to 56.9 percent. That decrease had been matched by a corre-
sponding increase in the fraction of beneficiaries to 29.2 percent. The fraction
of denied applicants had remained stable during that time.14 When comparing
population fractions among age categories, one can see that the increase in ben-
eficiaries was mostly concentrated among men 25 to 44 years old: the percentage
of beneficiaries 44 years or younger almost doubled during that time. However,
in absolute terms, the increase was highest for men age 55 years and older, those
participation increased from 29.7 percent to 42.6 percent. By 2002, the fraction of
non-applicants had decreased even further, but only slightly to 53.4 percent. The
fraction of beneficiaries had increased by another 4.2 percentage points, while the
fraction of denied applicants had decreased slightly. Comparing the 1996 panel to
the 2004 panel, we observe a further decline of the fraction of non-applicants to
51.8 percent, a 3.4 percentage increase in the fraction of beneficiaries, and a 1.8
percentage increase in the fraction of denied applicants.
Table 3.3 shows corresponding employment rates. The employment rate of
non-applicants is 61.1 percent in 1990, whereas denied applicants have an em-
ployment rate of 34.1 percent. Beneficiaries have an average employment rate of
5.7 percent.15 Across age groups, men 25 to 44 years have similar employment
rates as men 45 to 54, but their employment rates of non-applicants and denied
applicants are much lower than those of men 45 to 54. In contrast, the employ-
ment rate of beneficiaries age 25-44 is 14 percent, whereas it is less than 3 percent
for beneficiaries age 45 or older. For non-applicants and beneficiaries, this pattern
remains remarkably stable across most years and panels. These results imply that
the difference in the employment rate of non-applicants versus beneficiaries is not
14It appears that an increase in the application success probability since the mid-1980s has
mainly contributed to a stable fraction of denied applicants.
15As mentioned in section 3.2, beneficiaries are not prohibited from working fully, but may
work to some extend, as long as their earnings do not exceed a certain threshold, called the
“Substantial Gainful Activity” amount.
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necessarily larger for younger men as compared to older men.16
Table 3.4 presents the results using the first decomposition (equation 3.2). For
the 1990-1996 comparison, the decomposition suggests an estimated employment
decline attributable to the increased availability of DI benefits that exceeds the
overall employment decline if men 25 to 61 are considered. However, separate
decompositions by age groups reveal that employment rates declined during that
time period only for men who were 25 to 54 years old. For them, the DI growth can
explain all of the decline in employment. The contribution of the DI expansion
looks quite different if one considers the second decomposition (equation 3.3).
Table 3.5 presents corresponding results. This decompositions suggests that For
men 25 to 54 years old, the growth in DI can now only explain about half of the
overall employment decline.
Decompositions for 1996 and the 2001 and 2004 panel show a much larger
overall employment decline, which exceeds 10 percentage points for men who
are 25 to 44 years old. No matter which decomposition is used, these dramatic
employment changes are not nearly matched by a corresponding expansion of the
DI program. For men 25 to 61 years old, the growth in DI for the 1996-2001
comparison can only explain between 8 and 20 percent of the overall employment
decline, depending on which decomposition is used. For the 1996-2004 comparison,
the DI program can explain between 30 percent and 50 percent of the overall
employment decline. Even more startling are the decompositions for the three
different age groups. Especially for men 25 to 44 years old, the employment
decline which is attributable to the expansion of the DI program can at most
explain 20 percent of the overall employment decline. Further sensitivity analyzes
for the SIPP which support this finding are explained in appendix 3.8.
16For instance, in 1990, the difference is 46.5 percent for men 25-44 years old, but 66.9 percent
for men 44-54 years old and 51.1 percent 55-61 years old.
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While the SIPP data we have been working with has the distinct advantage of
being matchable to data that allows us to identify those who have applied for DI
benefits, there are a number of things about the data that raise concerns about
the comparability of the data across time. As we have discussed, the nature of the
questions that allow us to identify the disabled population has changed over time.
In addition, the fraction of SIPP respondents matchable to the administrative
data that allow us to identify DI applicants has declined over the years. We
worked hard to make the data comparable over time, but, still, it is natural to
worry about that comparability. For this reason, we turn to the CPS. Since 1988
the March Current Population Survey (CPS) has included a question to identify
those with a work limitation. Over time, this questions seems to have identified a
roughly constant share of the male working aged population is suffering from some
kind of limitation that effects the persons capacity for work (see figure 3.3). The
CPS data can not be matched to administrative data, and so can not, in the data,
determine who has applied for DI or SSI benefits. At the same time, it is possible
to identify those who are receiving Social Security benefits. For those under the
age of 62 virtually all workers who receive Social Security benefits are receiving DI
benefits. Figure 3.4 shows DI participation by age categories. It can be seen that
the fraction of male DI beneficiaries who are 25-44 years old remained constant
between 1995 and 2007, or even decreased slightly. Corresponding employment
trends by age groups from the CPS, as shown in figure 3.5, reveal that employment
rates declined the strongest among younger men between 1995 and 2008. These
patterns would certainly seem to suggest that something other than the increased
availability of DI benefits played an important role in the employment declines
of those identified as suffering from a work limitation. Finally, figure 3.6 shows
trends in employment for those in the CPS who identify themselves as limited, but
do not identify themselves as receiving Social Security benefits. The CPS shows
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striking employment declines amongst this group. Since the fraction of denied
applicants remained constant during that time period, this employment decline
can be interpreted as occurring primarily among those who never applied for DI.
Once again, we are left with the conclusion that the increased availability of
DI was not the only factor contributing to the employment decline amongst those
with a work limitation.
3.6 Conclusion
This study has attempted to reconcile divergent findings concerning the em-
ployment effect of the DI program. Using a decomposition strategy, we find that
it is unlikely that the growth in the fraction of DI beneficiaries during the early
1990s can fully explain the employment decline. This result is substantiated by
the steady employment decline during the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, with no cor-
responding strong increase in the fraction of beneficiaries. It therefore seems to
be likely that other factors than the DI program have contributed to employment
decline from 1990 to 2004. This is precisely the context in which the methods
used by Bound and Waidmann (2002) and Autor and Duggan (2003) are likely to
seriously exaggerate the causal role played by DI in explaining the decline in the
employment of men with work limitations. Future research will have to address
which other factors have led to this decline.
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3.7 Appendix: Data selection
Administrative records: Applications are identified through so-called 831 files.
When a person applies for DI, an 831 file is opened. It subsequently documents all
application stages up to the reconsideration stage.17 We use 831 files from 1978
onwards, which is the earliest year they are currently available. This restriction
is likely to understate the number of denied applicants slightly, especially for the
earlier years of the analysis.
While 831 records provide accurate information on application dates and out-
comes of initial application and reconsideration, they do not record appeal deci-
sions. However, an increasing fraction of initially denied applications have been
appealed. For instance, in 2002, about one-third of all applications were decided
through the appeal process. Of these, more than three quarters were successful,
as opposed to only 37 percent successful initial applications (Szymendera, 2006).
These successful appeals would be misclassified as denial by 831 records.
In order to improve on the accuracy of the application information of the
831 files, we augment them with the Master Beneficiary Records (MBR). The
MBR contain complete application information including appeals, but only for
the latest disability application. MBR records are matched to 831 files using
dates of application. Furthermore, we use the Payment History Update System
(PHUS) to identify successful appeals which have been erased from the MBR.
The PHUS records monthly information on benefits received from 1984 onwards.
They are matched to 831 files and MBR records using benefit begin dates.18
17If denied benefits at the initial determination process, applicants can ask for reconsideration.
If still denied benefits, they can further appeal the decision to an Administrative Law Judge and
an Appeal Board. See Benitez-Silva et al. (1999) for a detailed analysis of the appeal process.
18In practice, dates of filing might differ for same applications in these files. Therefore, we
matched records which were filed within 50 days. PHUS records are matched to 831 or MBR
records if the benefit begin date is within 100 days of the date an application decision has been
reached.
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Work limitation: The SIPP contains a standard work limitation question:
“Does [person] have a physical, mental, or other health condition which limits
the kind or amount of work [person] can do?” Before the 1996 panel, people were
asked this question during the first wave, and then only for some subsequent waves
which contained health and disability modules. In these modules, people who had
indicated a work limitation in a previous wave were reminded of his or her affir-
mative response before the question was asked again.19 With the 1996 redesign,
the work limitation question was included in all core surveys, and people were
not reminded of their previous response. Maag and Wittenburg (2003) show that
before the 1996 redesign, the prevalence rate of work limitation increased within
each panel over subsequent waves, whereas such a trend is not visible for the 1996
panel. They hypothesize that those who indicated having a work limitation in a
previous wave are more likely to respond positively to the question if they were
reminded about their earlier response. Figure 3.7 replicates their findings using
SIPP panels 1984 to 2004 for men age 25 to 61. As can be seen, the prevalence
rates generally increase within each wave before the 1996 redesign. In contrast,
the 1996, 2001, and 2004 SIPP panels do not exhibit such a trend.
As a consequence of this reporting bias, it is plausible that people with work
limitations are relatively more healthy for later waves than for earlier ones. Conse-
quently, employment rates of people with work limitation are likely to be upward
biased for later waves of these panel. Figure 3.8 demonstrates the effect of the
recall bias on employment rates. As the fraction of men indicating a work lim-
itation increases for SIPP panels 1984-1993, so does their employment rate. In
contrast, employment rates remain stable across waves for later panels.
In order to circumvent that the recall bias with respect to the work limitation
19Specifically, they are asked: “We have recorded that [person]’s health limits the kind or
amount of work [person] can do. Is that correct?”
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question affects estimates of employment changes, we restrict our analysis to the
first wave prior to the 1996 redesign. Figure 3.9 shows trends in the prevalence
rates of men with work limitations, using wave one, two, and four of SIPP panels
between 1984 and 2004. It illustrates that the prevalence rate remains fairly stable
between 1984 and 2004 when only same waves are considered. Figure 3.10 depicts
corresponding employment trends for men with work limitations. The decline in
the employment rate is similar to the CPS based trend of figure 3.1, albeit it seems
to have started earlier.
We also disregard the first wave of the 1996 panel, since numerous changes
implemented in the 1996 SIPP redesign are likely to have affected data reporting
for the first wave (see Maag and Wittenburg, 2003). As visible in figure 3.7, the
work limitation prevalence rate is somewhat higher for the first wave of the 1996
SIPP panel as compared to subsequent waves. This anomaly also appears for the
2001 SIPP panel. We suspect that similar implementation issues had affected that
wave, and disregard it as well. Concerning the 2004 SIPP panel, we consider the
first seven waves only, because administrative records are currently available until
the end of 2005.
SSN disclosure: Table 3.6 reports the percentage of men, 25 to 61 years old,
who did and who did not disclose their SSN for selected waves of panels 1984
to 2004.20 The percentage of men who disclose their SSN declines from 92% for
the SIPP 1990 to 85% for the SIPP 1996, and further to 76% for the SIPP 2004,
wave 1. Moreover, the percentage is only 62% for the SIPP 2001, wave 1, and
declines to just above 60% for subsequent waves of that panel. For that panel, the
low percentage of disclosures had apparently be caused by Census’ asking about
20For these tabulations, we select men as described in section 3.4, except selection based
on their SSN. Therefore, table 3.6 presents accurate percentages for the sample used for the
decomposition prior to selection based on SSN disclosure.
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respondents’ SSN through telephone interviews.
The decreasing SSN disclosure percentage poses two problems. First, since
those who do not report their SSN are subsequently disregarded, a lower disclo-
sure percentage reduces the final sample size.21 Second, and more seriously, if men
who disclose their SSN systematically differ from men who do not, than selection
based on SSN disclosure can bias the results from the decomposition. Table 3.7
shows demographic and economic characteristics for selected waves of those who
disclosed and those who did not disclose their SSN, respectively. Men who dis-
closed their SSN are more likely to be better educated, married and employed
than those who did not disclose their SSN. They also tend to be more likely to
report a work limitation for the 1990 SIPP panel, but they are less likely to do
so for the 2001 and 2004 panel. For a given panel, these differences in observable
characteristics suggest that we would overstate the employment rate among all
application groups, and understate the fraction of beneficiaries and denied appli-
cants, since these population groups are less likely to be higher educated, married,
and employed. Moreover, since the percentage of men who disclose their SSN de-
creases over subsequent panels, we would expect these biases to become more
severe for later panels. Consequently, we would obtain estimates for the increase
in DI enrollment and for the decline in employment rates which are too low.
In order to correct for these biases, we reweight the original population weights
provided by Census to account for non-random selection by SSN disclosure status
(see for instance Raghunathan, 2004). For that, we estimate weighted logit models
of SSN disclosure for each panel separately. We use the person-month weights
provided by Census and include the same variables as in table 3.7, except for
flexible age dummies.22 We then divide the original weights by the predicted
21Leaving men who do not disclose their SSN in the sample is not an option since they would
be classified as non-applicants, even though some of them are beneficiaries or denied applicants.
22We use the following age categories: 25-29 years, 30-34 years, 35-39 years, 40-44 years, 45-49
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values in order to obtain corrected weights. This procedure eliminates the biases
which result from selection on SSN if this selection, conditional on the observable
characteristics, is random.23
3.8 Appendix: Further sensitivity analyzes for the SIPP
In order to substantiate our finding that the DI program can explain little of
the employment decline in the SIPP since the mid-1990s, we combine each 1996
wave (except for the first) with a 2001 or 2004 wave (except of the first 2001 wave),
carry out the first decomposition, and aggregate the results into two sources of
employment changes: the employment effect due to changes in DI beneficiaries and
denied applicants (the first two terms in equation 3.2), and changes in employment
rates of non-applicants, beneficiaries, and denied applicants (the last three terms
of equation 3.2). This procedure amounts to 88 decompositions for the 1996-2001
comparison, and 77 for the 1996-2004 comparison. For the 1996-2001 comparison,
all 88 employment changes are negative and so are the total employment effects
of the DI program. For the 1996-2004 comparison, the two changes have the same
sign for 66 out of 77 cases, but in eleven cases, the employment change is positive
while the effect of the DI growth is negative. However, as argued earlier, the
results for the 2004 panel are likely to be confounded by much stronger changes
in the percentage of men indicating a work limitation (see footnote 13). For those
cases for which both differences are negative, the total employment effect never
explains more than 50 percent of the overall employment decline.
years, 50-54 years, 55-61 years.
23In order to verify our supposition regarding the bias due to SSN disclosure, we compared
population fractions, employment rates, and decompositions using the original person-month
weights and the corrected person-month weights. The correction does increase the fraction of
DI recipients and denied applicants, as well as decrease the employment rates for all applicant
groups. Furthermore, these changes tend to be more severe for panels with a lower disclosure
percentage. For the decomposition, we find that using the corrected weights slightly reduces the
role of the expansion of the DI program in explaining the observed employment declines.
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As a second way to validate the above result, we investigate the employment
rate of non-applicants. If the growth in the DI program since the mid-1990s
cannot explain much of the decline of the employment rate of men with work
limitations, then we would expect a decrease in the employment rate of non-
applicants during that time. However, using trends of employment rates from
the SIPP may be misleading, since the percentage of men who report a work
limitation decreased over subsequent waves for the 1996 and 2001 wave. Whether
this change in self-reported work limitations is a point of concern depends on why
the percentage of men who report work limitations declined. Figure 3.11 shows the
percentage of men with work limitations for two categories, namely whether the
respondent had participated in all waves of a panel or whether the respondent did
not. Rates of men with work limitations are generally higher for those who did not
participate in all waves as compared to those who did, and their rate also declines
over subsequent waves. Hence, it appears that men with more serious health
problems are more likely to drop out of a panel. In contrast, those who remained
in a panel for all waves have a relatively stable work limitation rate for both the
1996 and the 2001 panel. The decline of the rate of men with work limitations
over subsequent waves would therefore, if at all, understate the real employment
decline of non-applicants, since those who drop out of the panel are likely to be
more severely impaired and less likely to be employed. Figure 3.12 presents trends
in employment of non-applicants by participation. The employment rate increased
somewhat until the fifth wave of the 1996 panel, corresponding to the first quarter
of 1997, but then decreases until wave 12, which corresponds to the last quarter















Figure 3.1: Employment rates for men, 25-61 years, who indicate a work limita-
tion, 1981-2007.
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Figure 3.2: DI participation for men, 25-61 years, 1970-2007.















Men, 25−44 Men, 44−54 Men, 55−61
Figure 3.3: Percentage of men, 25-61 years, who indicate a work limitation (by
age categories), 1981-2007.
Source: CPS March Supplement
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Figure 3.4: DI participation for men, 25-61 years, 1970-2007, by age categories.















Men, 25−44 Men, 44−54 Men, 55−61
Figure 3.5: Employment rates for men, 25-61 years, who indicate a work limita-
tion, 1981-2007.
















Men, 25−44 Men, 44−54 Men, 55−61
Figure 3.6: Employment rates of men, 25-61 years, who do not receive Social
Security (by age categories), 1981-2007.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.1: Percentage of Men with Work Limitations
25-61 25-44 45-54 55-61
SIPP 1990, Wave 1 9.96 6.82 12.52 23.23
SIPP 1996, Wave 2 10.93 8.05 13.50 21.54
SIPP 2001, Wave 5 10.38 6.99 12.30 19.80
SIPP 2004, Wave 1 11.30 7.20 13.49 21.34
Note. – Source: SIPP panels 1984-2004. Original person-month weights provided by Census
have been used.
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Table 3.2: Population Fractions
Non-Applicants Denied Applicants Beneficiaries
Percentage N Percentage N Percentage N
SIPP 1990, Wave 1
Men 67.1 720 13.9 139 19.0 214
Men, 25-44 75.4 368 12.9 63 11.8 58
Men, 45-54 63.9 178 16.4 38 19.8 62
Men, 55-61 57.0 174 13.3 38 29.7 94
SIPP 1996, Wave 2
Men 56.9 904 13.8 224 29.2 475
Men, 25-44 64.9 456 13.3 99 21.8 158
Men, 45-54 54.3 286 15.0 74 30.7 157
Men, 55-61 44.0 162 13.5 51 42.6 160
SIPP 2001, Wave 5
Men 53.4 436 13.2 110 33.4 273
Men, 25-44 61.1 186 15.8 46 23.1 71
Men, 45-54 49.9 147 13.7 40 36.4 98
Men, 55-61 46.2 103 8.8 24 45.1 104
SIPP 2004, Wave 1
Men 51.8 1000 15.6 293 32.6 615
Men, 25-44 58.5 408 17.3 120 24.2 158
Men, 45-54 51.6 343 15.9 101 32.6 214
Men, 55-61 42.4 249 12.9 72 44.7 243
Note. – Source: SIPP panels 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2004 matched to SSA’s administrative
records on disability insurance applications and awards. Corrected person-month weights have
been used (see appendix 3.7).
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Table 3.3: Employment Rates
Total Non-Applicants Denied Applicants Beneficiaries
SIPP 1990, Wave 1
Men, 25-61 46.8 61.1 34.1 5.7
Men, 25-44 52.2 60.5 38.1 14.0
Men, 45-54 53.2 69.8 49.1 2.9
Men, 55-61 32.4 53.2 11.2 2.1
SIPP 1996, Wave 2
Men, 25-61 43.7 63.9 30.8 10.6
Men, 25-44 47.4 60.7 38.5 13.3
Men, 45-54 45.9 72.3 25.4 9.4
Men, 55-61 33.3 60.2 22.8 8.8
SIPP 2001, Wave 5
Men, 25-61 33.6 51.2 27.4 7.8
Men, 25-44 36.4 47.9 31.2 9.7
Men, 45-54 33.9 54.1 27.9 8.5
Men, 55-61 28.8 53.9 16.1 5.6
SIPP 2004, Wave 1
Men, 25-61 36.4 58.6 25.4 6.3
Men, 25-44 35.9 51.3 21.7 8.9
Men, 45-54 41.6 65.9 34.8 6.6
Men, 55-61 31.0 62.9 19.3 4.2
Source: SIPP panels 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2004 matched to SSA’s administrative
records on disability insurance applications and awards. Corrected person-month

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.6: Disclosure of Social Security Numbers
Panel Wave SSN non-disclosure SSN disclosure
Percentage N Percentage N
1984 1 13.58 1578 86.42 10011
1990 1 7.90 1048 92.10 11590
1991 1 11.31 929 88.69 7562
1992 1 11.50 1236 88.50 10214
1993 1 12.26 1360 87.74 10239
1996 2 15.20 2971 84.80 16996
1996 3 15.08 2896 84.92 16535
1996 4 15.27 2837 84.73 15956
1996 5 15.17 2755 84.83 15383
1996 6 15.17 2649 84.83 14861
1996 7 15.24 2597 84.76 14396
1996 8 15.47 2625 84.53 14224
1996 9 15.47 2563 84.53 13971
1996 10 15.39 2517 84.61 13746
1996 11 15.49 2516 84.51 13600
1996 12 15.75 2578 84.25 13597
2001 2 37.86 6234 62.14 10280
2001 3 38.78 6178 61.22 9876
2001 4 38.64 6088 61.36 9685
2001 5 39.43 6122 60.57 9415
2001 6 39.51 6170 60.49 9343
2001 7 39.77 6138 60.23 9244
2001 8 39.94 6071 60.06 9046
2001 9 40.19 5940 59.81 8783
2004 1 23.65 5231 76.35 20021
2004 2 21.09 4374 78.91 19093
2004 3 20.19 4049 79.81 18428
2004 4 19.31 3813 80.69 18093
2004 5 18.23 3531 81.77 17840
2004 6 17.16 3281 82.84 17636
2004 7 16.06 3081 83.94 17471
Note. – Source: SIPP panels 1984-2004 matched to SSA’s administrative records on disability
insurance applications and awards. Table entries are for men, 25-61 years old. We exclude
from the sample: (i) men who have been in the military; (ii) men who have applied or are
currently applying only for SSI; and (iii) men who are currently applying for DI/SSI or who
were beneficiaries for DI. Details concerning sample selection see appendix 3.7. Original person-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Angrist, Joshua D. (2001): Estimation of Limited Dependent Variable Models
with Dummy Endogenous Regressors: Simple Strategies for Empirical Research.
Journal of Business Economics Statistics, vol. 19(1): 2–28.
Autor, David H. and Mark G. Duggan (2003): The Rise in the Disability
Rolls and the Decline in Unemployment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
118(1): 157–205.
——— (2006): The Growth in the Social Security Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis
Unfolding. Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 20: 71–96.
Benitez-Silva, Hugo, Moshe Buchinsky, Hiu Man Chan, Sofia Chei-
dwasser, and John Rust (2004): How Large is the Bias in Self-reported
Disability? Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 19(6): 649–670.
Benitez-Silva, Hugo, Moshe Buchinsky, Hiu Man Chan, and Sofia
Sheidvasser (1999): An Empirical Analysis of the Social Security Disability
Application, Appeal, and Award Process. Labour Economics, vol. 6(2): 147–
178. Yale University.
Black, Dan, Kermit Daniel, and Seth Sanders (2002): The Impact of
Economic Conditions on Participation in Disability Programs: Evidence from
the Coal Boom and Bust. American Economic Review, vol. 92(1): 27–50.
Borghans, Lex, Anne C. Gielen, and Erzo F.P. Luttmer (2010): So-
cial Support Shopping: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity in Disability
Insurance Reform. IZA DP NO. 5412.
Bound, John (1989): The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance
Applicants. American Economic Review, vol. 79(3): 482–503.
Bound, John, Richard J. Burkhauser, and Austin Nichols (2003):
Tracking the Household Income of SSDI and SSI Applicants. In: Polachek,
Solomon W. (Ed.), Worker Well-being and Public Policy. Amsterdam: JAI,
pp. 113–148.
Bound, John and Richard V. Burkhauser (1999): Economic Analysis
143
of Transfer Programs Targeted on People with Disabilities. In: Ashenfel-
ter, Orley. and David Card (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3,
chap. 51. Elsevier.
Bound, John and Timothy Waidmann (2002): Accounting for Recent De-
clines in Employment Rates among Working-Aged Men and Women with Dis-
abilities. Journal of Human Resources, vol. 37(2): 231–250.
Bratsberg, Bernt, Elisabeth Fevang, and Knut Red (2010): Disability
in the Welfare State: An Unemployment Problem in Disguise? IZA Working
Paper No. 4897.
Burkhauser, Richar V., Mary C. Daly, Andrew Houtenville, and
Nigar Nargis (2002a): Self-Reported Work-Limitation Data: What They
Can and Cannot Tell Us. Demography, vol. 39(3): 541–555.
Burkhauser, Richard V., J.S. Butler, and Robert R. Weathers II
(2002b): How Policy Variables Influence the Timing of Applications for Social
Security Disability Insurance. Social Security Bulletin, vol. 64(1): 52–83.
Burkhauser, Richard V., Butler J. S., and Gulcin Gumus (2004): Dy-
namic Programming Model Estimates of Social Security Disability Insurance
Application Timing. Journal of Applied Econometrics, vol. 19: 671–685.
Card, David, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber (2007): Cash-on-Hand and
Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor
Market. Quarterly Journal Economics, vol. 122(4): 1511–1560.
Chen, Susan and Wilbert van der Klaauw (2008): The work disincentive
effects of the disability insurance program in the 1990s. Journal of Economet-
rics, vol. 142: 757–784.
Chetty, Raj (2008): Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemploy-
ment Insurance. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 116: 173–234.
Currie, Janet (2004): The Take-Up of Social Benefits. UCLA Working Paper.
Duggan, Mark, Perry Singleton, and Jae Song (2007): Aching to Retire?
The Rise in the Full Retirement Age and its Impact on the Disability Rolls.
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 91: 1327–1350.
Dynarski, Susan and Jonathan Gruber (1997): Can Families Smooth Vari-
able Earnings? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 1997(1): 229–303.
Gruber, Jonathan (1997): The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unem-
ployment Insurance. American Economic Review, vol. 87(1): 192–205.
144
Halpern, Janice and Jerry A. Hausman (1986): Choice under Uncertainty:
A Model of Applications for the Social Security Disability Insurance Program.
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 31(2): 131–161.
Heckman, James J. (1979): Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.
Econometrica, vol. 47(1): 153–161.
Heckman, James J. and Burton Singer (1984): A Method for Minimizing
the Impact of Distributional Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration
Data. Econometrica, vol. 52(2): 271–320.
Hu, Jianting, Kajal Lahiri, Denton R. Vaughan, and Bernard Wixon
(2001): A Structural Model of Social Security’s Disability Determination Pro-
cess. Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 83(2): 348–361.
Jaeger, David A. (1997): Reconciling the Old and New Census Bureau Edu-
cation Questions: Recommendations for Researchers. Journal of Business and
Economic Statistics, vol. 15(4): 300–309.
Joint Economic Committee (2010): Extending Unemployment Insurance
Benefits: The Cost of Inaction for Disabled Workers. U.S. Congress.
Kreider, Brent (1998): Workers Applications to Social Insurance Programs
when Earnings and Eligibility are Uncertain. Journal of Labor Economics,
vol. 16(4): 848–877.
——— (1999): Social Security Disability Insurance: Applications, Awards, and
Lifetime Income Flows. Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 17(4): 784–827.
Lahiri, Kajal, Jae Song, and Bernard Wixon (2008): A Model of So-
cial Security Disability Insurance Using Matched SIPP/Administrative Data.
Journal of Econometrics, vol. 145(1-2): 4–20.
Lando, Mordechai E., Mlacom B. Coate, and Ruth Kraus (1979): Dis-
ability Benefit Applications and the Economy. Social Security Bulletin, vol. 42:
3–10.
Lindner, Stephan (2011): Ho Does Unemployment Insurance Affect the Deci-
sion to Apply for Social Security Disability Insurance? Working Paper.
Low, Hamish and Luigi Pistaferri (2010a): Disability Risk, Disability In-
surance and Life Cycle Behavior. NBER Working Paper No. 15962.
——— (2010b): Wage Risk and Employment Risk over the Life Cycle. American
Economic Review, vol. 100(4): 1432–1467.
Maag, Elaine M. and David Wittenburg (2003): Real Trends or Measure-
145
ment Problems? Disability and Employment Trends from the Survey of INcome
and Program Participation. Urban Institute.
McCall, Brian P. (1996): Unemployment Insurance Rules, Joblessness, and
Part-Time Work. Econometrica, vol. 64(3): 647–682.
Meyer, Bruce D., Wallace K.C. Mok, and James X. Sullivan (2008):
The Under-Reporting of Transfers in Household Surveys: Its Nature and Con-
sequences. University of Chicago Working Paper.
NYDL (2010): Unemployment Insurance: Information for Claimants. New York
State Department of Labor.
Parsons, Donald (1991): The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability In-
surance Applicants: Comment. American Economic Review, vol. 81(5): 1419–
1426.
Raghunathan, Trivellore E. (2004): What Do We Do with Missing Data?
Some Options for Analysis of Incomplete Data. Annual Review of Public Health,
vol. 25(1): 99–117.
Rupp, Kalman and David Stapleton (1995): Determinants of the Growth in
the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs – An Overview. Social
Security Bulletin, vol. 58(4): 43–70.
Strand, Alexander (2002): Social Security Disability Programs: Assessing
the Variation in Allowance Rates. ORES Working Paper Series Number 98.
Social Security Administration.
Sullivan, Daniel and Till von Wachter (2009): Job Displacement and
Mortality: An Analysis Using Administrative Data. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, vol. 124(3): 1265–1306.
Szymendera, Scott (2006): Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and
Supplemental Security Income (SSI): Proposed Changes to the Disability De-
termination and Appeals Processes. Tech. rep., Congressional Research Service.
von Wachter, Till, Jae Song, and Joyce Manchester (2010): Changes
in the Economic Outcomes to Allowed and Denied Applicants in Social Secu-
rity Disability Insurance from 1978 to 2004: An Analysis using Longitudinal
Administrative Records. Forthcoming, American Economic Review.
146
